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 ABSTRACT 
 Most scholarship on American colonialism in the Philippines has focused on 
the actions of the United States government and American policymakers in the 
archipelago.  I argue in this thesis that there is a significant alternative narrative to 
American colonialism in the Philippines that highlights the agency of Filipino actors 
and how they dealt with the perceived challenges of the colonial experience, 
specifically regarding the newly integrated territories occupied by Muslim 
communities principally located in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.  I focus on 
the early stages of American colonialism, defined roughly from 1900 to the 1920s, 
when American colonial policy was still in its formative stage and the inclusion of the 
Muslim areas into the nascent Filipino nation was not yet certain.  
I consider three important challenges faced by Christian Filipino politicians 
because American administrators favored a form of rule of the Muslims communities 
in the southern islands of the archipelago that was distinct from the lowland, 
Christian-occupied regions.  The first challenge I consider is how the Filipino political 
elite in the early 1900s articulated their desire for the inclusion of Muslim areas of the 
archipelago while at the same time asserting Christian civilizational superiority.  
Although Muslims were governed separately from the rest of the colony from 1900 to 
1913, they formed a crucial part of the Filipino national imaginary and the Filipino 
elite considered Muslim occupied regions essential to nation state formation even at 
the very beginning of the American colonial period.  By including the Muslim regions 
in studies of early American colonialism in the Philippines, we are able to better 
understand the agency of Christian Filipinos in the colonial process.  The second 
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challenge to the Filipino elite concerned how they were to prove that they were 
capable of self-governance and autonomy, especially given the United States colonial 
mission of training Filipinos in democratic governance until they were ready to govern 
themselves.  When Democrat President Wilson and his appointed governor-general for 
the Philippines, Francis Burton Harrison, put Filipinos in control of the colonial 
governance of Muslim occupied territories in 1916 following the passage of the Jones 
Law, Filipinos mimicked the United States’ colonial policies and metrics in governing 
the Muslims to show their capability for autonomy.  I argue that during this time 
period, Christian Filipino policies directed towards the Muslims were American in 
appearance and colonial in nature.  The third challenge facing members of the Filipino 
elite was how to respond to Muslim resistance in Mindanao and American 
reservations that took this resistance as proof that Filipinos had not yet achieved the 
necessary level of “civilization” to govern themselves.  The ways in which the Filipino 
elite responded both challenged and redefined the ideological motivation for American 
colonialism by highlighting American imperial interests in the resources of Mindanao 
and pointing to the contradictions embedded in US colonial policy.  
By analyzing Christian Filipino responses to the often forgotten possibility that 
the Muslim-dominated regions of the Philippines could have been separated from the 
rest of the archipelago, we see the strategies used by Christian Filipinos to both 
comply with and rebel against the specious American doctrine of colonizing the 
Philippines to train Filipinos in democracy.
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARDS A HISTORY FROM WITHIN 
 
 Benedict Anderson writes of the Philippines that: 
 
Few countries give the observer a deeper feeling of historical vertigo than the 
Philippines.  Seen from Asia, the armed uprising against Spanish rule in 1896, 
which triumphed temporarily with the establishment of an independent 
republic in 1898, makes it the visionary forerunner of all other anti-colonial 
movements in the region.  Seen from Latin America, it is, with Cuba, the last 
of the Spanish imperial possessions to have thrown off the yoke, seventy-five 
years after the rest.1 
 
Studying the Muslim regions of the predominantly Catholic Philippines seems only to 
add to this vertigo.  Towards the dusk of Spanish rule in the late 1800s, these regions 
were located primarily in the southern islands of the archipelago, principally 
Mindanao and Sulu.  Named Moros by the Spanish, Muslims in the Philippines were 
infamous in the islands as pirates, raiders, and slavers of unarmed (largely thanks to 
Spanish policies) lowland Christian regions.  Finally forced into treaties with Spain 
due to defeats at the hands of the more technologically advanced Spanish navy, 
Muslim sultans entered a testy relationship with the Spanish crown that lasted until the 
intervention of the United States and the American purchase of the Philippine 
archipelago in 1898.   
The Republican American colonial administration put in charge by President 
William McKinley then organized the Muslim regions as the Moro Province and the 
United States Army administered them separately from the rest of the archipelago 
until 1913.  With the election of pro-Filipino independence, American Democrat 
                                                 
1 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons:  ationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World 
(London; NY: Verso, 1998), 227. 
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Woodrow Wilson, the region would be incorporated into the rest of the Philippine 
civil government.  Wilson’s appointee, Governor-General William Harrison, took 
charge in 1916 of the “Filipinization” of the region, and Christian Filipinos, who so 
recently could have been forced into bondage at the hands of Muslim raiders, found 
themselves in positions of power over the Muslims who Filipino nationalists now 
deemed “brethren” and “brothers.” 
 This study illuminates aspects of the relationships between the Christian 
Filipinos and Muslims in the archipelago during the early period of American 
colonialism, defined roughly from 1900 to the late 1920s, via Filipino nationalist 
responses to perceived threats that the Muslim regions of Mindanao could be split 
from the rest of the Philippines.  This oft-forgotten historical possibility produced 
responses from the Filipino elite that are valuable to our understanding of the 
relationships within the archipelago as well as the growing tension between the 
Christian Filipino elite and their Muslim counterparts. 
Research regarding this time period has been scarce and focuses primarily on 
the actions of the United States federal government and American policymakers in the 
archipelago.  By focusing instead on the agency of Filipino actors and how they dealt 
with the perceived challenges of the colonial experience regarding the newly 
integrated territories occupied by Muslim communities, I show how nationalist, elite 
Filipinos responded to American colonialism and the ways in which they expressed 
their capacity for self-autonomy.  From 1900 to the 1920s, American colonial policy 
was still in its formative stage and the inclusion of the Muslim areas into the nascent 
Filipino nation was not yet certain.  Therefore, the stakes for nationalist leaders who 
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wanted the mapped boundaries of the Philippine archipelago to be preserved and to 
keep the rich natural resources that accompanied contested areas were high.2 
 The wealth in natural resources of the non-Christian and Muslim-occupied 
regions was fabled, and had significant influence on the desire of the Philippine 
political elite (and that of US politicians) for control of the non-Christian and Muslim 
occupied regions of Mindanao and Sulu despite the fact that neither the Filipinos nor 
the Americans was ever able to develop the regions to the potential cited by reports.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive overviews of the natural resources of the islands 
were done by the Philippine Bureau of Agriculture in 1922 and again in 1928.3  P.J. 
Wester, who served as agricultural advisor in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu 
from 1917-1919, spearheaded the production of the report.  Wester wrote that 
although “no complete geologic and soil survey has been made…it is evident to the 
casual traveler that it [Mindanao] is extremely rich in natural resources, capable of 
production of the great tropical staples of commerce on a very large scale.”4  He 
comments that “climatically, Mindanao is more favorably situated than all the larger 
islands in the Archipelago to the north,” an unusual amount of land is available for 
                                                 
2 Maps drawn up by Spanish missionaries at the end of the 1800s included the non-Christian and 
Muslim dominated regions as part of the colony despite the fact that Spanish control of these areas 
varied widely.  See Mapa de las razas de Filipinas 1899 in U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, Atlas of the Philippine Islands (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 
also reproduced in the appendix.  Although the map was published for the U.S. treasury department, it 
was drawn up by Spanish Jesuit missionaries using sketches, drawings, and calculations prior to US 
arrival.  For more regarding the role of mapping in the envisioning and formation of the nation-state, 
see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a  ation (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1994).  Thongchai’s contribution helped inspire Benedict Anderson to add an 
additional chapter, titled “Census, Map, Museum,” to his seminal work.  See Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  ationalism (London and New York: 
Verso, 2006), 167.  
3 See P.J. Wester, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago: Their  atural Resources and Opportunities for 
Development (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1928).  This is the updated edition of the original 1922 
release.   
4 Wester, 11. 
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agricultural purposes and that the soil is “virgin and exceedingly fertile.  Practically 
every tropical crop can be grown there.”5  The rivers and waters “abound in fish,” and 
the numerous falls and rapids “could furnish abundant power for industrial and 
transportation purposes and for irrigation.”6  He concluded his overview of the 
resources of Mindanao and Sulu by stating that: 
It has been said that the Philippines is the richest undeveloped region on earth 
today.  A broad statement.  That it stands in front rank is unquestioned, 
however.  As the second largest island in the Archipelago and well known to 
possess greater natural advantages than any of the others, therefore, the 
development of Mindanao presents a fascinating subject to the student of 
economics, and an unusual opportunity for constructive statesmanship. 
 
The perceived economic potential of these regions on the part of the Filipino political 
elite no doubt heightened the stakes for their retention of control of the Muslim 
regions. 
I have chosen to focus specifically on the Manila-based Christian Filipino elite 
given their positions of power and education and the ample evidence of their views of 
the Muslims and Muslim-occupied regions expressed in their written works, published 
speeches, and addresses to the United States Congress and Presidency.  They were 
members of the Philippine Commission and in the American established colonial 
government.  This study, therefore, can make limited suggestions regarding the 
opinions of the majority of the Filipino Christian masses towards the Muslim tribes of 
Mindanao and Sulu, but focuses instead on the articulation of Filipinos in power 
regarding their Muslim counterparts and the various ways that they, in essence, used 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 12. 
6 Ibid., 13. 
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the Muslim populations to achieve their own objectives and political ends.7  By 
looking at the often forgotten historical possibility that the Muslim dominated regions 
of the Mindanao and Sulu may have been separated from the rest of the Philippines 
and how Filipinos responded, we are able to learn more about the Christian Filipino 
investment in the regions, be they emotional, economic, or nationalist than we learn 
about the viewpoints of the Muslims.  To do justice to the Muslim voices regarding 
this time period and what they wanted politically, economically, and socially, would 
require a different set of sources as well as the fluency in the local languages of the 
Muslim regions to access them.8 
The focus on the Christian Filipino elite in this study, however, is justified by 
the fact that they were in positions of power to shape the discourse related to the 
Muslims, and would eventually occupy posts in the colonial government of Muslim 
                                                 
7 I mention this distinction because the stakes for the Filipino, lowland Christian masses and the elite 
differed.  Understanding popular notions about Muslims among a wider Christian Filipino audience 
may shed more light on the relationship between them in the archipelago, especially considering that 
how Christian Filipinos felt regarding self-autonomy and independence varied greatly depending on 
class.  See Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 
1840-1910 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 16.   Ileto gives one account of a 
“history from below” by using as source material the Payson Pilapil, considered the most pervasive 
epic poem based on the life of Jesus Christ on the Tagalog village level.  Ileto argues that the pasyon 
contains a subversive element that empowered the masses by making available “a language for venting 
the ill feelings against oppressive friars, principales, and agents of the state” (16).  Ileto then shows how 
the language of the payson and the ideals derived from both it and other forms of popular expression 
would later appear repeatedly in popular movements and revolutions among the masses.  He argues that 
the masses’ notion of kalayaan (freedom) in popular uprisings and revolutions from 1890 to 1910 
differed from the visions of independence that preoccupied the ilustrados and the elite of Tagalog 
society.  The lower masses expected that after years of war between Americans and Filipinos, “society 
would be turned on its head…all men would be brothers, leaders would be Christ-like, all forms of 
oppression would end and property would be shared; in other words, when their image of kalayaan 
would turn into a lived experience” (207).  Members of the elite, however, “yearned for autonomy in 
the context of the stable society of the past in which they were the ‘natural’ leaders” (207). 
8 For more about the Muslims in the Philippines, see Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines 
(Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines Press, 1973), Thomas McKenna, Muslim 
Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998).  Primary sources can also be found at the Library of Congress and 
the National Archives in Washington, DC, but are in local languages, primarily Tausug.  
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dominated regions.  They also had the most to gain from the Muslim territories.  
Finally, looking at elite Christian Filipino articulations of difference between 
themselves and Muslims helps us understand how the nascent nation was forming.  
While the responses on the part of the Filipino elite regarding the role of Mindanao 
and the Muslim communities in the Philippines were not monolithic, sources show 
that they were invested in the future of region even at the very beginning of American 
colonialism when Muslim regions, organized as the Moro Province, were governed by 
the US Army as opposed to the civil administration put in place to govern the 
Christian regions of the archipelago. 
American colonists viewed themselves as the “trustees” of inferior races in the 
archipelago, races that through training could be taught the “American” values of 
democracy and liberty.  They did not, however, perceive the races as being at equal 
stages on the scale of civilization.  Due to their contact with the West through 
colonization by Spain, Filipinos were deemed higher on this scale while the “wild 
people,” namely the Muslims and the non-Christian tribes, were perceived as even less 
civilized.  Although contact with Spain advanced the Filipinos on the civilizational 
scale, Spanish influence was also deemed to be polluting.  Prominent Americans, like 
Philippine Commission member Dean C. Worcester, felt that the Muslims would make 
better colonial subjects given that they were free of the corrupting influence of the 
mestizo elite and of the Spanish Catholic friars.9  I argue in Chapter 1 that Filipinos 
needed to prove that they were capable of administering their Muslim counterparts by 
                                                 
9 See Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
1914), chapters 20-25.  As quoted in Vicente Rafael, White Love, and other Events in Filipino History 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 47. 
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asserting civilizational difference while at the same time highlighting racial 
similarities in order to keep the archipelago together.   
I also argue that the Christian Filipino elite defined what it meant to be Filipino 
against the Muslims and other minority groups under American control.  I contend that 
this response was preconfigured by recognition of superior American military might 
and acceptance of American colonial ideology.  Thus, defining the nation in contrast 
to American rule was precluded by the necessity to cooperate with the regime and 
prove their own civilized state.  By focusing on the actions of the Christian Filipino 
elite and their relationships with the Muslims, I hope to fill a gap in current 
scholarship.   
Historian Glenn Anthony May, for example, concentrated on American 
colonial education policy in the Christian regions of the islands, concluding that 
American efforts at “social engineering,” or as he defines it, the molding and 
restructuring of a society, failed in the Philippines as the United States did not 
accomplish either its short term or long term goals in the colony.10  He focuses 
specifically on the years 1900 to 1913 and deliberately excludes the Muslim regions as 
they were governed separately from the Christian regions of the colony during this 
time period.  I argue that although they were governed separately, the Muslim regions 
of the Philippines played a critical role in early Philippine state formation and were an 
integral part of the Filipino national imaginary.11 
                                                 
10 Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: the Aims, Execution, and Impact of 
American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (London: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
11 In a separate chapter (chapter 2), I expand upon May’s thesis by including the pro-independence 
American Democratic administration of the Philippines rather than focusing solely on the Republican 
period when looking at social engineering. 
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Just as May excludes the Muslims and focuses more on American 
policymakers in the archipelago, so too does Peter Gowing elide the role that Christian 
Filipinos played in the early years of the formation of the nascent nation-state in 
Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899 to 
1920.12 Gowing argues that Americans failed to accomplish their mandate (or “social 
engineering,” in May’s terminology) in Moroland just as May argues that they failed 
to do so in the Christian regions.  Gowing defines this mandate as raising the Muslims 
to the political and educational level necessary to govern themselves in a modern 
world.  He attributes its failure to the short duration of American colonialism in the 
region and the decision on the part of American Democratic Governor-general Francis 
Burton Harrison to Filipinize the colonial government, and so too blames the Christian 
Filipinos.13 
Julian Go has characterized the Filipino reception of US democratic tutelage as 
a tactic irreducible to “resistance” that he dubs “domestication,” a process by which 
Filipinos applied existing local political ideologies and values to the unknown ones 
coming from the Americans, thus harnessing American ideologies according to 
preexisting local practical schemas and discursive categories.14  In essence, Go states 
that the preexisting ideology used was largely that articulated by Malolos politician 
Apolinario Mabini, whose logic of government was premised on the idea of “mutual 
exchange” between a governing class and the popular masses.  The “governing class” 
                                                 
12 Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 
(Quezon City: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977), 
336-344. 
13 Gowing, 336-344. 
14 Julian Go, “Colonial Reception and Cultural Reproduction: Filipino Elites and United States Tutelary 
Rule,” The Journal of Historical Sociology, 12, no. 4, 1999. 
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was led by razón and the popular masses would obey them not out of any fear of 
retribution or presumed despotism, but rather because it was in the masses’ interests to 
do so, in order to benefit from this exchange.  He too focuses on the Manila-based 
Christian Filipino. 
All three works, however, seem to miss the importance of the rhetoric among 
Christian Filipino politicians regarding the Muslims of the south, and the role that this 
would play in the politicization of Muslim identity and the future problems that this 
would cause.  This politicization has been noted in John D. Harbor’s Master’s thesis, 
“Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: the Case of Moro Identity.”15  
Harbor points to the historical politicization of Moro identity combined with the 
centralization processes of President Ferdinand Marcos as being the main catalyst for 
igniting violence in the region, rather than religious or ethnic intolerance or difference.  
He, however, glosses over the relationships between the Christian Filipinos and 
Muslims and the internal colonization of the islands that took place under Christian 
Filipino rule during American democrat Governor-general Harrison’s political tenure.  
Failure to understand the historical origins of the Christian-Muslim relationship leads 
Harbor to conclude that “the decentralization policies of the Ramos administration 
(1992-1998) and the compromise between his administration and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (the dominant Muslim faction) may have finally resolved the 
conflict.”16  Violence in the region, however, persisted well after the publication of 
                                                 
15 John D. Harber, “Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: the Case of Moro Identity” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998).  
16 For an alternative and better documented viewpoint of the development of Filipino Muslims that 
identified with a grouping based on their religious commonality, see Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers 
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Harbor’s thesis and will most likely continue in the future—making it all the more 
pressing to understand the history of the Muslim-Christian Filipino relationship. 
While political scientist Patricio Abinales gives more attention to this issue 
than Harbor, he collapses the interests and stakes of Filipino Christian politicians and 
their American rulers.17  While there no doubt existed alliances between these two 
groups, elite Filipinos of the era mention continuously their relative fitness to rule over 
the Muslim dominated regions compared to the Americans.  Through their role in the 
colonial infrastructure of Mindanao, they needed to prove their capacity to rule 
themselves.  A focus on Filipino responses to the perceived threat of losing Mindanao, 
highlights their perception that these regions were crucial to the nation and reveals 
how they used these regions in their quest for independence, a tactic currently missing 
from the Philippine historical record. 
Chapter three will go into detail regarding the Filipino takeover of government 
posts in the Muslim regions, which is key to understanding the outsider status of 
Muslims in the Philippines and which has lasting effects today.  When Democrat 
President Wilson and his appointed governor-general for the Philippines, Francis 
Burton Harrison, put Filipinos in control of the colonial governance of Muslim 
occupied territories in 1916, Filipinos mimicked the United States’ colonial policies 
and metrics in governing the Muslims to show their capability for self-governance.  I 
argue that during this time period, Christian Filipino policies directed towards the 
Muslims were American in appearance and colonial in nature.   
                                                                                                                                            
and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998). 
17 See Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the  ation-State 
(Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 34-40, 55-60. 
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Although colonial mimicry has been described in the work of several writers, 
few have mentioned the type of semi-imperial mimicry that I discuss.  In “Of Mimicry 
and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” Homi Bhabha describes how the 
post-Enlightenment, English imperial order imposed on the colonized an imitative 
identity that was flawed--almost, but not quite, that of the colonizers, or “almost but 
not white.”18  This mimicry is also a menace to the colonial order, which Bhabha 
locates in mimicry’s “double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial 
discourse also disrupts its authority.”19 He develops his thesis further in “Signs taken 
for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, 
May 1817,” 20 stating that “mimicry marks those moments of civil disobedience within 
the discipline of civility: signs of spectacular resistance.”   His theories about colonial 
mimicry, however, fall short of describing the semi-imperial behavior of the Filipino 
elite who, I argue, mimicked American colonial policies and metrics not out of 
resistance, but rather in order to prove their own capacity for autonomy by 
demonstrating that they too could colonize, “civilize,” and establish order in a 
population considered less civilized than themselves (i.e. the Muslims).  In this light, 
mimicry of the American colonial regime by Christian Filipinos in relation to their 
Muslim counterparts was a calculated move on the part of the elite that complied with 
what was viewed as acceptable by the American regime (rather than alternatives such 
as armed resistance) and therefore legitimized actions Americans took regarding the 
Christian Filipinos. 
                                                 
18 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 127. 
19 Bhabha, Location, 129. 
20 Ibid., 162. 
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Just as the elite legitimized American imperial behavior, however, so too did 
they challenge it.  Chapter four will discuss how members of the Filipino elite 
responded to Muslim resistance in Mindanao and American reservations that took this 
resistance as proof that Filipinos had not yet achieved the necessary level of 
“civilization” to govern themselves.  The various ways in which the elite responded 
both challenged and redefined the ideological motivation for American colonialism.  
The elite mocked American “lessons” by subverting American ideology in justifying 
why they were fit for self-government. 
Chapter five concludes the thesis and shows how understanding elite Christian 
and Muslim relations in the archipelago during the early stage of American 
colonialism allows us a fuller picture of how Philippine nation-state formation took 
place.  
   13 
CHAPTER 2 
THE CIVILIZATIONAL CONTEST 
 
Introduction 
To bring to a close this part of our study, let us charge ourselves with an idea 
several times enunciated…to control Mindanao…which consists in organizing 
a government that shall comprise the group of islands in the south…separate 
from the rest of the colony and dependent on the Governor General solely in 
regard to the definite solution of grave subjects of general interest to the 
country. 
 
We believe that we must not only do this but, on the contrary, it is absolutely 
indispensable…. 
 
Don Julian Gonzales Parrado, General of Brigade of the Spanish army in 
Mindanao, wrote the above passage in his memoirs concerning Mindanao in 1893.1  
Recognizing the cultural distinctiveness of the ethnolinguistic groups of the Mindanao 
region, he called for its separation from the rest of the colony, noting the failure of his 
army to establish anything more than a tenuous hold of the region as well as that of the 
Jesuit priests to convert the local Muslim population and collect taxes and tribute for 
the state.2  He writes that they held “very little or no jurisdiction in the interior” of 
Mindanao and that “our military attitude before the immense majority of the Muslims 
is purely defensive in lines of resistance intended to restrain by force their aggressions 
and misconduct.”3  His primary motivation for separating Mindanao was not just 
ideological, but economic and logistical.  If a civil government similar to the one in 
other parts of the archipelago was established in Mindanao, Parrado believed that there 
                                                 
1  “Memoria concerning Mindanao,” 1893, Edward Bowditch Papers, Cornell University, Box 1. 
2 The region of Mindanao that I refer to here corresponds with the island itself, as well as the Sulu 
archipelago, the Calamianes, and Paragua (now known as Palawan).   
3 “Memoria concerning Mindanao,” 1893, Edward Bowditch Papers, Cornell University, Box 1. 
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would be grave abuse, including negligent handling of finances by Spanish officials, 
corruption, and the rise of aggression and alienation among the Muslims themselves as 
a result.  He thus argued for a purely military administration of the island, a venture he 
hoped would also end the piracy of rich coastal Visayan regions by the Muslims.   
His call for the separation of the southern islands and purely military 
administration would find their echo in United States army reports dating from the 
early 1900s.  In fact, Sulu and the island of Mindanao were classified as special 
regions of the newly purchased colony of the Philippines and were put under direct 
control of the army.4  U.S. Army officials recognized that a military government 
would be needed to maintain peace and stability.  They also largely considered the 
Muslim groups of the south, which included the Sulu, Malanao, Samal, and 
Matabanganan, as inferior to their Christian, lowland counterparts.  
Consider statements by Najeeb M. Saleeby, whose many roles in the colonial 
state included serving as assistant chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes, 
superintendent of schools in the Moro Province, and as a member of the Legislative 
Council of the Moro Province.  He wrote in 1913 that: 
A wide and deep chasm separates the Moros from their Christian neighbors.  
Marked inequality in culture and radical differences of civilization make it 
impossible to govern them alike.  Two forms of government are at present 
necessary, one for the Moro and one for the Christian.  The Moro has to 
develop, reform, and rise to the level of the Christian before the two 
governments can be united or incorporated.5 
                                                 
4 See Mapa Etnográfico de Filipinas, in U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
Atlas of the Philippine Islands (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), located in the 
appendix.   The dark green regions approximate the areas that became part of the Moro Province.  Note 
that Paragua is now known as Palawan.  
5 Najeeb M. Saleeby, The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History of the Solution of the 
Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands (Manila: E.C. McCullough & Co., 
1913), 16.  Although Saleeby advocated different administrations for the Moro and Christian Filipinos, 
he believed in integrating the Moros into the Filipino polity. 
   15 
 
 The Filipino Christian elite at this time had already embraced a western 
influenced democracy in the form of the Malolos Republic, which was proclaimed on 
January 23, 1899, by President Emilio Aguinaldo.6  Governance for the various tribes 
in the Moro province at the turn of the century, however, still relied on datus and local 
strongmen, although the degree of institutionalization varied widely among them.7  
American officials ranked the Muslims low on the scale of civilization, and the 
difference in traditions and governance led both Muslim leaders and American officers 
in 1908 to echo the call made earlier by Spanish colonial officials for the separation of 
Mindanao from the rest of the colony.8 
 The received narrative characterizes the relationship between Moro leaders and 
Manila politicians as one of varying degrees of resistance and political 
accommodation, and seems to de-emphasize the responses made by Filipino political 
leaders to army officials’ calls for the Moro province’s separation.  This chapter will 
highlight these responses and add nuance to the relationship between Philippine 
metropole and periphery by showing how leaders of the nascent Philippine state, such 
as Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera, Sergio Osmeña, and Camilo Osias, depended on the 
Muslim and non-Christian minority groups in their quest to prove that they were in 
fact civilized enough to be granted autonomy and control of the state while at the same 
                                                 
6 On February 5, 1899, a mere two weeks after the formation of the Malolos Republic, Aguinaldo 
authored a manifestation declaring war against the United States.  The US put down what it called the 
Philippine Insurrection, and President Theodore Roosevelt declared the end of the hostilities in July 
1902, although sporadic acts of guerilla warfare persisted. 
7 The most institutionalized forms of Islamic government seemed to be those of Sulu and Maguindanao 
while more recently Islamized tribal groups, such as the Samal, still had a relatively informal level of 
governance organized around the datu. 
8 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, (New York: Roman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 124. 
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time asserting that the Moro Province should not be separated from the rest of the 
Christian dominated archipelago.  This burden of proof is significant in that President 
William McKinley, upon acquiring the Philippines, adopted a policy of “benevolent 
assimilation,” promising that the United States would train Filipinos in democratic 
governance until they were ready to govern themselves.9 
Contrasts with the Muslims and non-Christian tribes had already given the 
Filipinos some cultural capital with certain American colonists who recognized their 
supposed cultural superiority.  The Muslims would prove a convenient “other” against 
which Christian leaders could define what being Filipino meant while at the same time 
being careful to highlight commonalities to prevent the separation of the province and 
validate Filipino ambitions to administer the Muslim (and non-Christian) regions of 
Mindanao that had historically been hostile to Christian control.  Filipino intellectuals 
could not use the United States as the outsider to define the nascent nation since the 
path to independence was perceived to lie more in convincing the US that Filipinos 
were civilized.  Once Christian Filipinos were put in control, the progress of 
Mindanao’s Muslims was touted as a measure of the capability of Christian Filipinos 
in state administration.  When the Democrats gained control of the U.S. Presidency 
and Congress in 1913, the colonial infrastructure in the Moro Province would be 
Filipinized and Mindanao was treated more like a colony of the central state rather 
than a participating province.  It would become a site used by Christian Filipinos to 
alleviate land shortage, make new alliances and attract new followers, thus 
                                                 
9 Writers of Post-9/11 terrorism literature have pointed out similarities between this policy and the 
official rhetoric concerning the establishment of democracy in Iraq. 
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consolidating their political power.  Muslims and non-Christians in the islands 
remained outsiders in the process.10  
The separation that this study makes among Filipino, Muslim, and non-
Christian ethnoreligious categories is a deliberate move justified by the historical 
context of the time period.  At the turn of the century, Filipino did not denote the 
entire peoples of the archipelago.  The Census of 1903 characterized the society of the 
archipelago as “a collection of many tribes speaking different languages” and declared 
that the term Filipino should be “properly applicable to the Christian peoples only.”11  
It thus helped consolidate self-identification as Filipino by grouping together previous 
census categories such as “Spanish-Filipino” and “Chinese-Filipino” while at the same 
time clearly denoting the outsiders: namely, the Muslims (called Moros, the Spanish 
term for Muslim Filipinos, by American officials), the non-Christian tribes, and the 
ethnic Chinese.  The meaning of Filipino, however, would shift over time to allow a 
degree of inclusion to these outsiders.  The term “non-Christian tribes” is especially 
tricky—I have treated them as a separate category as most colonial records seem to 
use the term to refer to those that were not only non-Christian but also non-Muslim; 
they practiced forms of animism considered more primitive than the other two 
religious traditions.    However, use of the term to refer to the Muslims did take place.  
                                                 
10 For more about Muslim resistance and responses, see Chapter 4.  As a more exhaustive analysis of 
the viewpoints of Muslims would require a different set of sources than the one used in my study, see 
also McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels. 
11 Daniel F. Doeppers, “Evidence from the Grave: The Changing Social Composition of the Populations 
of Metropolitan Manila and Molo, Iloilo, during the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Population and 
History: The Demographic Origins of the Modern Philippines, ed. Daniel F. Doeppers and Peter Xenos 
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 266. 
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When this is the case, it will be specified.12  Other writers have aptly explored the 
power of the census in the creation and reification of ethnic and religious categories.13  
The extent to which inhabitants of the Philippines identified themselves with certain 
labels and the ways in which these categories of self-identification changed are 
significant to this period in Philippine history, and remain understudied.  This chapter 
will re-examine the role of the Muslims in the development of the nascent nation-state, 
arguing that even at the state’s very inception under American colonial rule, the 
Muslim tribes played a critical role in helping political leaders define a national 
Filipino character and fortify their power.  In a larger sense, it seeks to foreground the 
different ways that leaders of a weak state can use the periphery in the construction of 
the nation and in achieving their own political ends. 
Historical Background 
The historical context of American state building in the Philippines from 1900 
to 1935 is useful in understanding the development of the Philippine political system, 
the perceived conditions for and challenges to Philippine independence, and the 
conditions that produced the competing political ends of nationalist politicians.14  It is 
significant that American colonial state building in the Christian Philippines differed 
from that in the Moro and non-Christian provinces.   
                                                 
12 The non-Christian tribes deserve serious attention by scholars of Filipino colonial development and 
they too served as useful outsiders to Filipino nationalists in their quest to define a national character.  
However, time constraints limit coverage of non-Christian, non-Muslim groups in this study. 
13 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  ationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 2006), chapter 8, titled “Census, Map, Museum.”  See also Vicente Rafael, 
White Love, and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), for his 
discussion on the census in the beginning chapters. 
14 Much of this context has been taken from Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the 
Philippines, chapters 5 and 6. 
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In the Christian regions, which included all of the lowland provinces in Luzon 
and the Visayas, the United States established a professional civil service, 
promulgated a system of public education, and formed and trained a Philippine 
constabulary to keep the peace.  Although warfare and resistance from Filipino 
insurgents who fought for the recently minted and short-lived Malolos Republic 
continued, colonial state-building in pacified areas coincided with the fighting.15  
Executive positions in the agencies aforementioned were limited to Americans, 
although Filipinos occupied lower level positions.  In 1906, the civil service contained 
roughly 2500 Americans, 4600 Filipinos and 1500 Spaniards.  Education involved a 
much greater percentage of Filipinos as the expansion of English education 
outstripped the supply of American teachers, who in 1902, numbered only 926 
compared to over three thousand Filipino teachers.   Filipinos also participated in the 
constabulary, with some even becoming junior officers.16   
 In addition to these institutional pillars, colonial officials set up municipal 
governments.  Elections commenced in pacified areas of the colony as early as 
December 1901 with the first polls for municipal officials in February 1902.  As of 
mid-1903, over 1000 municipal governments and 31 provincial governments had been 
created.  In 1907, elections took place for representatives to the Philippine Assembly, 
a government body intended by the United States colonial government to be a training 
ground in democracy for Filipinos to take a hand in the affairs of the colony and gain 
political experience.  President McKinley’s instructions to the Philippine Commission 
                                                 
15 Fighting was fiercest between 1899 and 1902, and sporadic incidences of guerilla warfare persisted as 
late as 1906.   
16 Onofre D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1957), 169, 
183 (table 5), 195, as quoted in Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 120. 
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in 1900 were that “the distribution of powers…is always to be in favor of the smaller 
subdivision.”17  This construction of government from the local level up is significant 
in the development of Philippine politics; indeed, as Amoroso and Abinales writes, to 
win a local, provincial, or assembly seat, “an aspirant first deployed his local network 
of family, friends, and business associates.”18  Filipino political aspirants also sought 
patronage from American officials who had valuable connections and could introduce 
the Filipino aspirants to other elites with powerful local networks. 
 Filipinos in the early 1900s were thus given a multitude of ways to participate 
in the nascent state—they could become staff members in the civil service, teachers in 
the Department of Education, officers in the constabulary, municipal administrators 
and leaders, provincial governors, and representatives to the Philippine assembly.  
This early induction into the political arena gave Filipino politicians a leg up in 
comparison to their Moro counterparts for they had more time to forge political 
alliances and power blocs.   
Governed directly by the US army from 1900 to 1913, Muslims were given 
fewer chances to participate in the nascent state.  American colonial officials 
considered them at least two generations away from democracy.19  Although datus 
often served as brokers of the colonial regime and acted as tribal ward leaders to 
collect taxes and police their own domains, Muslim political participation outside of 
these roles was limited. 
                                                 
17 U.S. War Department, Instructions to the Taft Commission through the Secretary of War, William H. 
McKinley (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900). 
18 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 135. 
19 See Najeeb M. Saleeby, The Moro Problem, 5. 
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 Army rule of the southern provinces was largely successful at establishing 
peace between the previous warring Muslim groups and fostering trade and economic 
growth.  Due to the growth in exports as a result of the nascent hemp, rubber, and 
timber industries as well as the establishment of special markets that allowed Muslims 
to trade directly with port cities in Southeast Asia without interference from Chinese 
and Filipino middlemen, the Moro Province became “completely dependent upon its 
own revenues” by 1913.20  Its attraction to Filipino politicians grew with its 
commercial success. 
Defining a Filipino ation using a Muslim Foil 
Americans in the Philippine archipelago considered the Christian Filipinos 
more civilized than their Muslim counterparts from the very beginning of the 
American occupation in 1899.  This perception among Americans can be attributed to 
the closer relationship that Filipinos had to the Spanish colonial state, Western style 
education (among the elite), and adoption of Christianity.  Filipino leaders in the early 
1900s took advantage of this concession in a number of ways.  They defined a national 
Filipino character in contrast to the Muslims of the southern islands and posited that 
the American goal of eventual autonomy of the archipelago required that the Filipinos 
civilize their Muslim counterparts so that the Muslim communities of the south would 
look at their Christian neighbors as brethren.  “Civilizing” the Muslims also served the 
purpose of showing that not only were Filipinos ready for autonomy but that they too 
were capable of civilizing and teaching other peoples the ways of democracy. 
                                                 
20 Patricio N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine 
 ation-State (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 2000), 21. 
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Perhaps the most striking example of the use of the Muslim communities to 
define a national character comes from one of the first Filipino members of the 
Philippine Commission, Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera.  Tavera was born on April 13, 
1857, and was a prime example of an elite Filipino ilustrado.  A creole, he resided in 
Intramuros, Manila, and went to the best schools in the colony, receiving his 
bachelor’s degree from the Colegio de San Juan of the Ateneo Municipal.  He would 
follow his uncle to France where he took up medical studies and received his Doctor 
of Medicine from the Sorbonne.21  He came back to the Philippines in 1887 on a royal 
commission to study Philippine medicinal plants, stayed and married, and published 
widely on an array of topics that included medicine, paleography, linguistics, 
numismatics, cartography, history, metrical romances, education, and social problems.   
He was elected president of the Partido Federalista, the foremost political party 
in the Philippines in the early 1900s.  The party platform included eventual annexation 
of islands by the United States.22  Given that the Sedition Law passed by the US 
Congress in 1901 provided for the death penalty or a long prison term for anyone 
advocating independence from the US even by peaceful means, this political party’s 
rise was hardly surprising.  Since it was the only political vehicle supported by United 
States government officials, it is difficult to assess whether its constituents actually 
professed the party’s beliefs or joined the party out of political necessity.  There is 
                                                 
21 The history of Tavera’s uncle, Don Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, is an interesting one.  He was an 
outspoken advocate of colonial reform, which ended up being the principle reason for suspicion by the 
Spanish authorities that he participated in the Cavite Mutiny of 1872—a charge he denied.  He was 
summarily exiled to Guam, but later forgiven.  Deciding that emigrating to France would offer a better 
future than returning to the Philippines, he moved to Paris.  He would later be the host of many 
ilustrados abroad, including José Rizal, among others. 
22For more information on political parties in the Philippines, see Rommel C. Bahlaoi and Clarita R. 
Carlos, Political Parties in the Philippines: from 1900 to the Present (Makati City: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 1996). 
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some evidence to suspect that Tavera may have preferred American annexation, 
however, as he stuck to his affiliation as a Federalista even after the Sedition Law was 
relaxed and the Partido Nacionalista, whose platform included independence from the 
US, was recognized in 1907.  The Nacionalistas became the dominant political party 
in that same year and would remain so until the 1930s. 
In 1912, Tavera gave a political speech in Manila to an audience of American 
and Filipino officials titled the “New Filipino Mentality.”23  His speech is largely a 
response to comments made by U.S. officials like Dean C. Worcester, also a member 
of the Philippine Commission, regarding the idea that Muslims actually made better 
colonial subjects because they had never been under the corrupting influence of the 
Spanish friars and there was no ready equivalent to the Filipino Mestizo elite.24  He 
evidences how elite Filipino politicians began to define what being Filipino meant and 
how that related to the Muslims of the south.  He states that: 
Amongst the Christians, the Spaniards created and maintained what might be 
called Causes of Aggregation, not only by the imposition of one king, one flag, 
one law and one religion and language, as I have said, but in insisting on fixing 
in the mind of the Filipino ideas of fraternity, solidarity of the nation, paternal 
government of the ruler, filial submission on the subject, the obligation of the 
former to protect the latter, and confidence of the governed in the omnipotence 
of the king on earth and in his religion to secure eternal bliss in a future life.  It 
does not now concern us to ascertain whether this program was faithfully 
carried out in practise [sic] in the Philippines, as it is not our purpose to write a 
historical criticism but to analyze a pschycological [sic] transformation.25 
 
                                                 
23 Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera, “The New Filipino Mentality,” Edward Bowditch Papers, Cornell 
University, Box 1, 13. 
24 See Dean C. Worcester, The Philippines Past and Present (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
1914), chapters 20-25.  As quoted in Vicente Rafael, White Love, and other Events in Filipino History 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2000), 47. 
25 Tavera, “The New Filipino Mentality,” 13. 
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Tavera locates progress in the “Causes of Aggregation” created by the Spanish, and 
stresses that there existed an important psychological transformation in the (Christian) 
Filipino mind that implanted ideas of fraternity, nationalism, responsible governance, 
loyalty to the state, the obligation of the state to protect its citizenry, and the peace of 
mind that eternal bliss in a future life could be secured by having confidence in the 
ruling regime and in one’s religious values.  He views all of these things as the 
provenance of the Christian Filipino alone.  He is careful to direct attention away from 
historical criticism, perhaps suspecting that he would be challenged by Filipino 
nationalists that had rebelled against Spain and likely felt quite different about the 
Spanish contributions.  His perception of Spain’s legacy in the islands can be 
attributed to his background as a Filipino Manileño with Spanish roots and relatives 
connected to the Spanish colonial administration.  His division of the peoples of the 
Philippine archipelago along ethnoreligious lines allows him to explore what he terms 
the “Filipino mentality.” 
 This mentality is a legacy of the Spanish colonists not solely due to the causes 
of aggregation that he mentions, but also to the territorial unity that the Spanish regime 
accomplished.  Tavera states that Spanish domination of the Filipinos was a useful 
change in that:    
it invoked, in order to justify war, the necessity of establishing peace among 
tribes in a chronic state of mutual armed aggression, making them see that they 
were all brothers, that all were under the same flag and under the same king; 
that bonds of union should exist amongst them instead of bloody antagonisms; 
that all united for the common benefit would insure peace and become stronger 
to repel foreign aggression and to subdue the southern Moros.26 
 
                                                 
26 Tavera, 17. 
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Tavera’s justification of the Spanish regime’s actions reveals his internalization of the 
Spanish colonial narrative.  One wonders whether he learned to think of colonization 
that way from his peninsular parents.  To Tavera, Filipinos were brothers that could 
not see their fraternal bonds due to bloody antagonisms and constant aggression until 
the Spanish brought them under the same flag and the same king, which are powerful 
symbols in Tavera’s speech of unity and fraternity.  Moros remained decidedly outside 
of these fraternal bonds.  While Filipinos were progressing along the scales of 
civilization, measured by their conception of nationalism and unity, Moros were still 
warring with each other and Filipinos in an unevolved, primitive state: 
While we note this evolution in the Filipinos…we find that the mountain tribes 
and the Moros continued in the same state of barbarism that characterized 
those times.  The idea of a common country had not yet penetrated their 
primitive consciousness, their independence has not yet a national character 
but is simply of a tribal caracter [sic]: it is the independence of a family 
[Tavera’s emphasis].27   
 
Through Tavera’s characterization of the Muslims as barbaric and stuck in the past, he 
reinforces the more evolved nature of the Filipinos.  He opines that Muslim desire for 
independence must be considered distinctly from that of the Filipino and that Muslims 
can only aspire to the independence of a family.  He argues that the Muslims are 
unable to identify with a sense of a greater “nation,” instead seeing the tribe as the 
largest unit of grouping.  The value of his characterization tells us little about the 
Muslims themselves and more about attitudes of elite Filipino intellectuals and the 
ways they used the Muslims conceptually as a mechanism to highlight and define a 
national Filipino character.  To elite intellectuals like Tavera, the Muslims were 
primitive peoples stuck in the past that could be civilized by Filipinos.  He goes so far 
                                                 
27 Tavera, 17. 
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as to delegitimize their desires for independence by dismissing them as the desires 
limited to a family wanting to be independent.  These desires even become a site of 
comparison for Tavera to highlight the more reasoned and developed nature of the 
Filipino’s quest for autonomy.  
 According to Tavera: 
Their [ie Moros’] sense of aggroupment [sic] did not go beyond the association 
of a limited number of individuals; we see that there is a limited feeling in 
favor of aggregation; that in favor of the aggregation of tribes does not exist; 
on the contrary, the spirit of segregation predominates amongst them, for 
which reason their spirited desire for independence is of no value for their 
civilization.  They look upon the Christians as foreigners and if we regard them 
as belonging to a common country it is only because our new mentality has 
made us capable of forming this idea [Tavera’s emphasis]. 
 
There are several interesting things at work in this passage.  As stated previously, 
Moro desires for independence are distinct from that of the Filipino, and in fact, Moro 
tribes of the south embody a spirit of segregation such that these desires are of “no 
value” for their civilization as a whole.  Tavera is correct to point out that the Muslim 
population consisted of several different ethnolinguistic groups and there was no 
significant unification movement in 1912.28  Although Tavera seems to recognize the 
resistance of the Moros to forming a unit based on their tribal affiliation, he chooses to 
attribute this to a primitive mentality rather than to diversity of beliefs and a history of 
competition.  Filipino desire to include the Muslims as part of the nascent nation 
becomes more evidence that Filipinos have advanced.  Tavera argues that the 
Filipinos’ “new mentality” is that of a civilized people. 
                                                 
28 Note the contrast with the Chinese community in the Philippines who at this point did self-identify as 
a group.  For more on the formation of collective identity based on being Muslim, see McKenna, 
Muslim Rulers and Rebels.  For more on the Chinese communities, see Edgar Wickberg, Chinese in 
Philippine Life, 1850-1898 ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).  
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 Any prominence or prestige that Muslims had among the Filipinos and 
Americans, he attributes as products of barbarism.  He confides that: 
with respect to the mountain tribes and Moros, the lowland Filipino also 
regarded them as inferior to himself….  With respect to the Moros, their 
predatory activity, piracy and the terror inspired by their conduct to the 
Christians were certainly sufficient reasons for their having won a certain 
prominence and prestige; but the Spaniards, as leaders of the Christian 
Filipinos, gave the Moros lessons sufficiently severe to raise the vanity of the 
Filipinos to the point of placing it, with good grounds, over that of the 
Moros.29 
 
His characterization of the Moros as predators, pirates, and sources of terror for their 
Christian counterparts is juxtaposed in his speech with his description of Filipino 
Christians and the lessons that Catholicism in general taught the Filipinos, evidencing 
his pro-Spanish tendencies.  His pride in the “lessons” the Spaniards taught is perhaps 
misplaced as the Sulu and Magindanao sultans had been able to resist Spanish rule for 
well over two hundred years.  Tavera then gets even more specific about the 
consequences of Spanish colonialism and of Catholicism more generally.  He declares 
that “the synthetic result of the intervention of Spain in our archipelago was the 
foundation of Philippine nationality and of the thought translated to the desire and 
necessity of national independence [Tavera’s emphasis],” an assertion he’s able to 
make through the comparison with parts of the archipelago that remained on the 
peripheries of Spanish control.30  The history of the Muslim tribes act as an essential 
cultural precipice that Tavera can climb to gain a bird’s eye view of what he sees as 
the legacy of Spain to her colony.  From such a vantage point, Tavera is able to define 
the character of the Filipino more generally.  Since the American colonial mission 
                                                 
29 Tavera, 14. 
30 Tavera, 24. 
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stressed the occupation of the Philippines as a way to prepare the Filipinos for 
democracy, Tavera uses the Muslims to highlight the similarities of Filipinos to the 
new (and former) colonial administration.  Unlike typical nationalists promoting 
independence, Tavera and other intellectuals could not use the United States as the 
outsider to define the nascent nation since the path to independence was perceived to 
lie more in convincing the US that Filipinos were civilized.  Note his comments on 
Catholicism, meaningful only in comparison to the religions of other Filipino peoples 
since Americans largely embraced a similar faith: 
…Catholicism substituted for fatalism hope; taught mercy, charity, individual 
responsibility in future life; made it understood that work was the lot of man 
without distinction of class, though it gave it the biblical character of an 
expiatory course the injustice of which was not analyzed because the primitive 
Philippine mentality thought that the community might incur responsiblity 
[sic] for an individual offense; it established a fundamental and elementary 
ethic with the ten commandments of the Mosaic law; it uplifted woman; it 
founded the ideal of justice equally distributed before the tribunal of God who 
dispenses rewards and and [sic] punishments according to the merits of each 
individual without regard to the distinctions established on earth and, with the 
example of Christ giving his lige [sic] for the redemption of mankind, it 
sustained the spirit of Rizal serene and smiling until the moment he lost his life 
for the redemption of his country.31 
 
He credits Catholicism for teaching Filipinos lessons in civilization—measured by 
their acceptance of responsibility for their actions, development of an ethical code 
based on values in the Ten Commandments, treatment of women, and conceptions of 
justice and sacrifice.  His placement of Rizal in the tradition of Jesus is significant—
showing that the Filipino nation was beginning to take on a divine, holy importance to 
the Filipino elite.  His use of Catholicism to express nationalist sentiments is situated 
in the larger historical trend of using the Muslim and other non-Christian outsiders in 
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order to place the Filipinos closer to the Americans on the scale of civilization so as to 
achieve autonomy.32   
 Tavera’s speech, in addition to defining the new Filipino mentality, also 
addressed the notions of certain colonial officials regarding the Filipinos.  He declares 
that: 
On account of the easy manner in which many barangays were brought under 
Spanish sway as well as of the loyalty with which they associated themselves 
with the Spaniards in order to cooperate with them in the conquest of their 
neighbors, compared to the conduct observed by the mountain trives [sic] and 
by the Moros, some persons have thoughtlessly made a wrong deduction.  It 
consists in supposing that the Filipinos of the lowlands, afterward called 
Christian Filipinos, were pathetic, servile, weak and destined to live forever 
under foreign sovereignty.  Such persons likewise inferred from the resistence 
[sic] offered by the mountain folk afterward called infidels, that they acted 
under the true influence of patriotism, as the true representatives of national 
independence the Moros being cited as the finished type of invincible 
patriotism.  We shall soon see what were the results of the submission of the 
lowland people and of the unyielding character of the others.33 
 
This passage gives us a fuller picture of the context of Tavera’s speech and of the 
elite’s attempt to define a national character in juxtaposition to the Muslims.  Just as 
they were seeking to define themselves, they too were being defined by their colonial 
administrators.  Tavera seems especially offended that Americans or others would 
admire the Muslims as products of patriotism.   
 Tavera concludes by saying that “this is, Ladies and Gentlemen, in broad 
outline, the new Filipino mentality, catalogued in the same table with the civilized 
                                                 
32 The question of intentionality emerges:  how aware were Filipinos of what they were doing?  The 
answer to this varies with the degree of interiority one is able to gain in the historical record.  Tavera 
shows strong signs of internalizing the civilizational order that he describes.  Regardless of his 
intentions, his speech on the “New Filipino Mentality” depends on the Muslims and non-Christians to 
serve as examples of an earlier, more unevolved Filipino mentality. It seems very conscious, but the fact 
that they could be unabashed about it then versus now is in itself interesting and suggestive of the 
changes in context. 
33 Tavera, 13. 
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mentality of modern peoples.  In this table are two grades: no one claims that the 
Philippines shall take first rank, but it is on the right road over which it will travel 
without obstacles or great difficulties.”34  The first rank that he referred to belonged to 
Americans, but Tavera’s clear references tying the “new Filipino mentality” with 
values taught by Christianity, allow one to infer that by “Philippines,” he means the 
Christian Filipinos, leaving Muslims and the non-Christian tribes inside the geo-body 
but outside the newer, advanced, Christian mentality. 
Evidence of the ways that the nascent Filipino state used the Moro tribes is 
seen not only through the speeches of colonial collaborators such as Trinidad Pardo H. 
de Tavera.  The political writings of Sergio Osmeña, a critical political figure who 
would emerge as one of the most powerful elected members of the Philippine 
Assembly, also uses the Muslims as background against which he defines the Filipino 
nation and measures its readiness in achieving independence.  Osmeña, an ilustrado 
from an elite family from Cebu, presided over the Nacionalista Party, which was 
formed in 1906 and was the affiliation of 65 of the 81 delegates in the Philippine 
Assembly and of 23 out of 31 provincial governors.35  His previous roles in the 
colonial administration included being appointed acting governor of Cebu province in 
1904 and then serving as elected governor with the backing of Governor-general 
Cameron Forbes and ex-governor Taft in 1906.  
In 1910, he penned a submission to the Secretary of the Philippine 
Commission in which he argues that Filipino control of Muslims and non-Christians is 
necessary.  He states that: 
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If the Filipino nation is to govern itself in the future, and if these tribes are to 
form part of that nation, it is necessary that they be made to look upon the 
Christians as brethren, as fellow-citizens, with whom they will live and be 
united in a communion of culture and aspirations.  The Christians—as we have 
said elsewhere—cannot be said to be so lacking in practical sense as not to 
understand that it is to their interest to civilize these non-Christian tribes, 
which are an important factor in the population as well as in the defense of the 
native land.36 
 
Osmeña begins his appeal by reiterating the official mission of the American colonial 
project (Filipino self-governance when ready) and posits that Filipinos understand the 
need for the Moros to see them as fellow-citizens.  What is most significant about this 
passage, however, is that he positions Filipinos as capable of civilizing the non-
Christian tribes, an interesting localization of Kipling’s “white man’s burden.”  In a 
different Southeast Asian context, Tamara Loos has compellingly argued in Subject 
Siam: Family, Law, and Colonial Modernity in Thailand that the Thai state patterned 
its rule of the southern Muslim provinces after British colonial rule, a process through 
which Siam could showcase its modernity as also being a colonial power.  Osmeña’s 
suggestions on behalf of the Nacionalista Party are in line with this pattern of thought.  
His contention that Filipinos can take the reigns for the governance of the Moro tribes 
and civilize them is a way of elevating the Filipino to the level of the colonist. 
 In fact, he blames tension between Filipinos and the Moro tribes of the south 
on the Americans, arguing that the separation in how the Christian Filipinos are 
governed and how the special provinces are governed leads to problems.  He wrote to 
Governor-general William Cameron Forbes in 1910 that: 
This separation only tends to encourage a lack of common interests that in 
practice is converted into unreasonable prejudice toward one another.  The idea 
should be inculcated into the people of these tribes that this is a Filipino 
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government and for this reason they should be accustomed to seeing Filipinos 
at the head of the governments established among them.  The idea that is at 
present infused into them is that they must be protected from the alleged 
abuses of their own brethren, the Filipinos.37 
 
Osmeña accomplishes several things in this passage.  To begin with, he attributes the 
mutual prejudice between Filipinos and Moros to the American administration of the 
colony.  He then argues that the Moros must be made to understand that it is a Filipino 
government.  However, Moros are clearly not considered to be Filipino, but only 
brethren to them—and younger, subordinate siblings at that.  Moro participation in 
anything other than subjects to a Filipino-led government, however, is never 
mentioned or indeed, intended. 
 To make such an assertion, Osmeña had to first address reports of abuse of the 
Muslim communities by Filipinos.  He writes that: 
the fact that there have been instances of Filipinos invested with official 
authority over non-Christian tribes committing acts of abuse and oppression 
does not indicate a general policy, nor is it the standard of the conduct of the 
Christian people as a whole toward the non-Christian tribes.  The reference to 
those abuses seem [sic] to indicate the belief that the Christian inhabitants are 
not disposed to deal with the non-Christians justly and liberally, so as to give 
them an opportunity to attain the degree of civilization acquired by the 
Christian inhabitants....38 
 
He both dismisses abuses by Filipinos as isolated acts and reinforces the notion that 
the Christian inhabitants have attained a higher degree of civilization.  He goes on to 
discuss the merits of Filipinos and their capability to govern the Muslims with Muslim 
interests in mind.  He argues that the Filipinos are able to govern them even better than 
the Muslim communities themselves would be able to do.  This smacks of the same 
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colonial justification given by the United States in possessing the Philippines.  
Osmeña opines that: 
Surely there is no lack of Christian Filipinos of proved [sic] executive ability 
who can govern these tribes in accordance with the latter’s interest and 
welfare.  The present political and administrative organization, which separates 
the Christians from those who are not such, does not tend to prepare the people 
for an independent Filipino government, but creates for this latter in its time 
difficulties in its relations with the inhabitants of the non-Christian pueblos.  If 
the Philippine Assembly had jurisdiction over the territory occupied by the 
non-Christian tribes and over the Moro Province, the rational interest that the 
Christian peoples feel toward the progress and welfare of the pagan peoples 
would be made plain.39 
 
Not only does he blame American administration of the archipelago for creating the 
rift between Muslims and Filipinos, but also opines that such rifts have made to seem 
larger than they actually are.  He declares that “the idea has nearly always been 
exaggerated that there is real rivalry and hatred between the Christian and the non-
Christian inhabitants.  Nothing is, however, falser than this idea.”40  He continues, 
stating that “the simple notice among the non-Christian tribes of the establishment of a 
Filipino government in Malolos produced a genuine rapprochement in the feelings and 
relations of the Christian and non-Christian peoples, and the latter voluntarily offered 
their recognition and loyal support to the authorities of that government.”41  Osmeña’s 
statement occludes the fact that Moro tribes of the south ignored letters from Malolos 
politicians, and some even conducted raids into territory claimed by the Malolos 
Republic.42  It is hard to say whether Osmeña’s retelling of the past was deliberate or 
if it was based on faulty information.  However, what is more significant is the fact 
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42 Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Diliman: University of the Philippines Press, 1999), 
371. 
   34 
that he devotes so much space to discussing and redefining the relationship between 
Filipinos and Muslims.   
The declaration that he authored in the name of the Nacionalista party was 
meant for none other than the President of the United States in 1910, William Howard 
Taft.  It was a declaration with a wide scope and an ambitious task: the acquisition of 
independence and the establishment of Filipino governance across the entire 
archipelago.  Osmeña thus argues from within this framework that not only are 
Filipinos capable of governance and assuming the burden of civilizing their tribal 
counterparts, but that they are able to do so in a manner superior even to that of the 
Americans.  He writes that: 
We are convinced that a Filipino government is the only one that will be able 
to reach in a permanent manner and without violence a definite understanding 
with the non-Christian communities of the Islands, because the latter, in spite 
of the differences in religion and customs, do not and cannot escape the 
influence of ethnical [sic] unity and affinity.  This circumstance gives the 
Christian Filipinos the advantage of a better knowledge of the psychology of 
their fellow-countrymen and of establishing with them that class of relations 
which tends to consolidate national unity.43 
 
He makes appeals to what he imagines to be the “ethnical” unity of these two groups.  
This idea had gained an increasing amount of purchase among American colonial 
officials.  However, it should be pointed out that previous notions of race in the 
Philippines classified Filipinos (the Tagalogs and Cebuanos being two principal 
groups) as “raza Malay” while the Moro groups of the south were classified as “raza 
indonesiana.”44 
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Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera, discussed above, published an etymology of 
names for the races of the Philippines in the 1890s that sheds light on how racial lines 
were previously drawn.  He writes that: 
Political divisions of the islands respond to divisions based on language so that 
we can characterize the provinces and how they should be grouped by those 
that speak the same language.  We find in the island of Luzon the following: 
Tagalog, Pampango, Bicol, Pangasinan, Sambal, Ilocano, Ibanag or Cagaya.  
After we see that with each of these provinces exist different tribes, many with 
different languages, that have for one reason or another, a different name.  The 
Visayas apply to three dialects spoken in Cebu, Iloilo and Negros: Calamian o 
Cuyo is also a linguistic group and upon arriving to Mindanao we see that the 
territorial division is no longer of the character that it is in Luzon.45  
 
To the Spanish, differences in language were more of a determining factor in 
classifying the various tribes.  Priests had much more experience getting to know the 
cultural distinctiveness of these tribes than American colonial officials, whose time in 
the Philippines was generally of much shorter duration.  For the Spanish, classifying 
the tribes by language held political advantages—each different language group could 
have its own friar to learn the language, reorganize the populace, and collect tax and 
tribute for the Spanish crown.  As American political power was mediated through 
municipal governments, as long as the language groups had representation it mattered 
little that two groups speaking different languages may be grouped together. 
                                                 
45 Trinidad Pardo H. de Tavera, Etimología de los  ombres de Razas de Filipinas (Manila: 
Establecimiento Tipográfico de Modesto Reyes y C. a, 1901) 1.  Translation mine.  The original reads: 
Las divisiones políticas de las islas responden casi siempre á divisiones fundadas en la lengua, de 
manera que, principiando por hacernos cargo de los nombres que caracterizan las provincias cuando 
estas se aplican á agrupaciones que hablan la misma lengua, hallamos en la isla de Luzón los 
siguientes: Tagalog, Pampango, Bicol, Pangasinan, Sambál, Ilocano, Ibanag ó Cagayan.  Despues 
veremos que dentro de cada una de estas provincias existen diferentes tribus, muchas con lengua 
distinta que llevan, por esta razón ó por otra desconocida, un nombre diferente.  Bisayas se aplica á 
tres dialectos hablados en Cebú, Iloilo y  egros: Calamian ó Cuyo es tambien nombre de agrupación 
lingüista y al llegar á Mindanao vemos que la división territorrial no es ya del carácter que en Luzón. 
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 Evidence of the change in ethnic categorization among American colonial 
officials comes to us from Najeeb M. Saleeby, assistant chief of the Bureau of Non 
Christian Tribes in charge of Moro Affairs, and member of the Legislative Council of 
the Moro Province from September 1903 to June 1906.  In 1913 (3 years after 
submission of the Nacionalista Party’s petition for independence authored by 
Osmeña), Saleeby published The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the 
History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine 
Islands. He writes that: 
The general impression that the public has of the Moros is very incorrect…  
The majority of Americans and Spaniards who came in contact with them had 
neither respect nor sympathy for anything that was not American or European 
and unjustly  looked upon them as savages and fanatics.… Remove hostility, 
and the thin veneer of religion and dress, and the Moro is in every respect a 
Filipino.  He makes a good friend and a good pupil and is more industrious 
than the average Christian [emphasis added].46 
 
Saleeby describes religion and dress as a thin veneer despite the fact that culture is so 
often situated in a people’s religious practices and everyday dress.  He also glosses 
over the hostility between Christian Filipinos and Muslims, one which has a long 
historical trajectory when Christianized indios of the Visayas and southern Luzon had 
to worry about piracy from seafaring Muslims.  Given Saleeby’s knowledge of the 
Moro Province, his work was influential in the development of the area and shows that 
Osmeña’s claims to a common ethnic stock with the Moro tribes of the south had 
significant purchase with the American colonists. 
 This purchase allowed Osmeña and other elite political leaders to use the 
Moros as a foil and a barometer for the readiness for self-governance in a way that still 
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preserved them as part of the nascent nation.  Filipinos were eager to assume 
governance of the Muslim tribes and patterned themselves after the Americans in their 
quest to do so.  Osmeña writes that:   
We [the Nacionalista Party] rejoice in being able to state that the good sense 
and the good qualities demonstrated by the Filipino people in adapting their 
lives and customs to the practices of the civilized nations of Europe and 
America, give ample reason for expecting that with its present practical 
experience it will achieve success in its work of attempting an independent 
government.47 
 
He is careful, however, to give credit to Americans for the progress made.  However, 
he nuances this credit with a strong declaration that such “supervision” is no longer 
needed. 
 Towards the end of the proclamation, he writes in 1912 that: 
…They acknowledge that the American people has conducted itself with 
liberality [sic] toward the Filipinos after the latter were conquered.  But at the 
same time they believe that if much providential designs did exist, they have 
been completely carried out, and that after the twelve years that North America 
has sheltered these Islands under its flag and has given its inhabitants an idea 
of the theory and practice of a free people and a free government, its mission in 
these Islands has been fulfilled with honor and glory to itself, and it can entrust 
the government to the Filipinos with entire safety for the interests of the latter 
and of all the residents of the country.  The Filipinos have at all times 
demonstrated a large spirit of progress, a high interest in assimilating all the 
ideas and practices of the civilized peoples, and it is not to be doubted that they 
will work in accordance with these ideas and practices upon taking their place 
among the nations of the earth.48   
 
We find then that little more than a decade after the establishment of the 
American colonial regime in the archipelago, the largest political party in the 
Philippines was already positing that Filipinos were not only ready for self-governance 
but could also be put in charge of governing territories previously outside of their 
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control and civilizing the various peoples that called these territories home.  Elite 
political figures, like Sergio Osmeña and others in the Nacionalista Party, used the 
Moro tribes (along with other non-Christian tribes) then as a venue to request further 
control of affairs in the colony.  Their pleas did not fall on deaf ears.  With the election 
of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency in 1912, Democrats were given a chance to 
substitute their visions of Filipino state-building in place of those pursued by the three 
Republican administrations that preceded them (McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and 
Taft).  Where Republicans viewed the process of readying the Philippines for 
independence as a long one, Democrats favored a much more rapid transfer of power.  
1912 saw the appointment of Governor-general Francis Burton Harrison who was in 
charge of implementing the “Filipinization” of the colony.  Executive positions 
previously held solely by Americans were transferred over to Filipinos, who assumed 
a much greater role in the state.  Perhaps the only exception was in the field of 
education where American colonial officials still held the highest positions.  Of great 
significance to the Moro tribes, Harrison also transferred the authority for 
administering the Moro Province from the US Army to civilian Filipino politicians. 
The Moro Province would be reorganized as the Department of Mindanao and 
Sulu in 1913.  Filipinos would institute a series of changes, many concerning land 
reform of the area.49  This transfer of power would integrate Muslim elites into the 
Philippine political system for the first time—they became the political brokers 
mediating between their communities and the Filipino colonial state.  The charge of 
civilizing the Muslims would go to the largely Filipino-run Bureau of non-Christian 
                                                 
49 For more elaboration, see Chapter 3, under the subheading “Agricultural Development and Colonial 
Migration.” 
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tribes.  One of the executives of the bureau summarized its duty as “to continue the 
work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian 
Filipinos, and foster by all adequate means, and in a systematic, rapid, and complete 
manner, the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those 
regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence 
between, and complete fusion of, the Christian and non-Christian elements populating 
the provinces of the archipelago.”50 
With the passage of the Philippine Autonomy Act in 1916, Filipinos gained 
even greater control of the state.  The act “placed in the hands of the people of the 
Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them.”51  This 
power, however, was still mediated by the governor general and the United States 
Congress, as Congress ultimately held the authority to decide on economic issues 
involving trade.  The act abolished the Philippine Commission and gave the 
Commission’s legislative powers to the upper house of a newly created bicameral 
legislature.52   
Filipino control of the state, however, would be challenged with the election of 
Republican Warren Harding in 1921.  Harding replaced Governor-general Harrison 
with Governor-general Leonard Wood, who had serves as military governor of the 
Moro Province from 1903 to 1906.  Wood would work to reverse the policies of the 
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Harrison administration and to return the Department of Mindanao and Sulu to more 
American control.53 
His time as Governor-general is especially relevant to this study as his attempts 
at reversing the transfer of power produced an outcry among the Filipino political 
elite.  Not only did they protest his manner of governance, but also his views 
concerning the separation of Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the colony, which he 
advocated in a report co-authored with former Governor-general Cameron Forbes.  
This outcry was articulated by Manuel Quezon, then president of the Philippine 
Senate, and Camilo Osias, then president of the National University, in the book they 
co-authored, Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause, which was published in 
1924.  The ways in which the Moro tribes of the south were discussed in the book 
once again show their importance in the construction of the nascent nation-state.   
Osias strongly manifests the importance of racial commonality, insisting that 
there is Philippine ethnic homogeneity and national solidarity despite differences in 
religion and “emphasis given to the diversity of ethnographic groups and distinct 
language dialects in the Philippines.”  He argues that a “spirit of nationality” has 
grown and been recognized (by Secretary of War John W. Weeks, at least) as “being 
no longer in question.”  He quotes Dr. Merton I. Miller, who was an American 
scientist that was chief ethnologist of the American Bureau of Science, to contend that 
there is an “essential homogeneity of the Filipino People.”  Osias tells us that 
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according to Miller, “from the extreme northern end of the Archipelago to its 
southern-most limits, with the exception of the few scattered Negritos, the people of 
the Philippines, pagan, Moro, and Christian, are one racially.  There is some reason for 
believing that they migrated into the islands at two different times.  But in all 
probability they came from the same general region and have a common ancestry.”54   
By playing down differences among the peoples of the archipelago by arguing 
that they are all from the same ethnic stock, Osias is more firmly placing the Muslims 
within the limits of the Filipino state given their racial bonds.  He also speaks more 
directly on their behalf when asked by the Secretary of War about how well the 
Philippine government had kept the faith to protect and assimilate its Muslim and non-
Christian minorities.  Osias states that “I have myself been partly responsible for the 
direction of the non-Christian peoples during my incumbency in the directorate of the 
Bureau of Education, and I say from authoritative knowledge that that faith has been 
well kept, far better kept than under the Forbes-Worcester regime.”55 
 Osias continues his discussion of the Muslim communities and comments on 
the greater amount of progress made by Filipino administrators of the region as 
opposed to their American counterparts, stating that: 
Ladies and gentlemen: Conscious of the responsibility that weighs heavily 
upon my shoulders on this solemn hour, I wish to state as dispassionately as is 
possible under the circumstances that it remained for the period when the 
Filipino people and Filipino officials had better control of their own affairs and 
of the non-Christian people to achieve the greatest work of uplift and of 
progress ever accomplished in the non-Christian territory and for the non-
Christian people of the Philippines [emphasis added].56  
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The progress accomplished in the non-Christian territories of the Philippines is wholly 
attributed to the Filipino people, de-emphasizing as a matter of course the role that the 
non-Christians themselves played in this process.  The advancement and progress of 
the Muslims is used as a measure of Filipino achievement.  The following passage 
makes this even clearer.  Responding to Governor-general Wood’s request that the 
Bureau of Non-Christian tribes be placed under the department of public instruction 
“in order to facilitate the preparation of these groups to undertake more fully the 
responsibilities and obligations of citizenship,” Osias writes that: 
…[I]f the transfer had been made [it would have increased my] influence as a 
functionary of the Government; but above being a government official should 
be the consciousness of a national that he is a Filipino and from the standpoint 
of the Philippine Government as a whole and from the standpoint of his being 
a Filipino, he believed then and he believes now that the transfer recommended 
was wrong—wrong because one of the great achievements of the Filipinos in 
the last few years is found in the great work of uplift and nationalization of our 
 on-Christian brethren.  The incontrovertible fact is that the non-Christian 
Filipinos received the best treatment and attention when the Filipinos were 
given greater control of their own affairs…. [Osmeña’s emphasis]57 
 
This passage confirms that the progress of the non-Christians was used as a way to 
measure the accomplishments of the Filipino elite in the management of the state.  
Attention should also be paid to the fact that the non-Christian “brethren” are brought 
even closer into the state, and are now also referred to as non-Christian “Filipinos,” 
evidencing an important shift from the census of 1903 that stated that Filipino could 
properly apply only to the Christian population. 
Conclusion 
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The non-Christian areas of the archipelago, although located in the Philippine 
periphery, were in no way peripheral to the development of the nascent nation state of 
the country.  The uncertain future of the territorial integrity of the colony, divergent 
American opinions on the speed at which to transfer power to the locals, and the 
question of how Filipinos could prove that they were ready for autonomy and 
independence all contributed the highly contested development of the nation-state.  
Even into the 1920s, calls were made for the separation of Mindanao and Sulu from 
what became increasingly considered the Christian Philippines.  In the early years of 
state formation, Philippine intellectuals used the Muslims and other outsiders that 
were ranked lower on the scale of civilization as a basis of comparison for Filipinos 
and the Americans.   
As the speech by former Philippine commissioner Pardo H. de Tavera in 1912 
shows, colonization by Spain became glorified as a civilizing force that made Filipinos 
more educated in the ways of the West.  He lauds Spanish rule as helping to develop a 
more “authentic” (i.e. Western) form of nationalism and patriotism, although the 
Spanish crown ruled largely through friars for most of the colonial period.  He defines 
Filipino nationalism in contrast to the desires for autonomy of the Moro tribes—the 
desires of these groups were more akin to the autonomy sought by a “family” rather 
than a “nation.”  He defined the Filipinos as a people who were taught the values of 
hope, charity, individual responsibility, compassion, equality, ethics, justice equally 
distributed, and redemption—all lessons of Catholicism that Muslims did not receive.  
Tavera credits the ability to conceive of the nation to a new, more developed, and 
more civilized Filipino mentality.  Given the nature of the American colonial mission 
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in the Philippines—to govern for the benefit of the Filipinos only until they were 
ready to govern themselves—Americans became the models for the Filipinos.  As 
such, they could not define the nascent nation in opposition to them; instead, they 
defined it in opposition to their Moro and other non-Christian outsiders. 
While Tavera gives us evidence of how the Muslims were used as a foil to 
define a national Filipino character, the petition of the Nacionalista Party, authored by 
Sergio Osmeña, is representative of how the colonized Filipino elite could exploit the 
“less civilized” status of their counterparts by positioning themselves in a role 
occupied by their colonizers.  Osmeña’s proposal that the Filipinos be given charge of 
not only civilizing the Moros but governing them in their best interest is a powerful 
and strategic declaration that the Filipinos had “developed” to a point that put them on 
not only an even level with the American colonists regarding the administration of 
Mindanao, but on a superior one due to the ethnic commonalities between the 
Filipinos and the Muslims.  It also evidences an internalization of American colonial 
ideology.  Through the petition, the Nacionalista party is positing that they are able to 
shoulder the “white man’s burden” even better than the white (American) man 
himself.  The appeals to the idea of a common ethnic stock found purchase with 
American colonial official officials. 
Just as the Nacionalista Party’s petition shows how Filipinos could argue for 
their readiness for autonomy by positing their superior ability to “civilize” the Moro, 
so too does the co-authorship of Manuel Quezon and Camilo Osias of Governor-
general Wood and the Filipino Cause evidence the ways that the Filipino elite used 
the progress of the Moro tribes as a measurement of their own accomplishments.  This 
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work also shows us the evolving meaning of the term Filipino as more effort is made 
to be inclusive of the minorities given the impending threat of the division of the 
archipelago.   
 These three sources, largely overlooked by historians, add nuance to the 
relationship between the Philippine metropole and the periphery by showing how 
leaders of the nascent state depended on the Muslim and non-Christian outsiders to 
prove to their American overlords that they had attained a high enough degree of 
civilization to be granted autonomy and control of the state.  Even at the state’s very 
inception under American colonial rule in the early 1900s, the Moros played a critical 
role in helping political leaders define a national Filipino character and fortify their 
power. 





In his inaugural address to the Third Philippine Legislature on October 6, 
1913, newly appointed Democrat Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison 
conveyed the following message on behalf of President Wilson: 
We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United 
States but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands.  
Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of 
the Islands and as a preparation for that independence.  And we hope to move 
towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the 
Islands will permit…the administration will take one step at once and will give 
to the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the appointive Commission, 
and thus in the Upper as well as in the Lower House of the Legislature a 
majority representation will be secured to them. 
…In promising you on behalf of the administration immediate control of both 
branches of your Legislature I remind you, however, that for the present we are 
responsible to the world for your welfare and for your progress.1 
 
Harrison’s message heralded a decisive shift in American colonial policy in the 
Philippines.  From the beginning of American involvement in the archipelago, 
Republicans held the majority of seats in Congress and the presidency.  As major 
proponents of free trade, they were backed by interests in favor of imperialism: 
capitalists and industrialists looking for cheap sources of raw materials and expanded 
markets; and analysts that recognized the strategic importance of having a military 
presence in the Far East.  The policies and views of the McKinley (1897-1901), 
Roosevelt (1901-1909), and Taft (1909-1913) administrations favored a long tutelage 
of the Filipinos in order allegedly to prepare them for democratic self-government.  
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Many posited that this would take at least one generation for Christian Filipinos and 
two for the Muslim and pagan minorities.2   
During the Republican administrations, the Democratic Party, which had 
opposed Filipino colonization to begin with, “voiced furious protest of American 
occupation and proposed independence ‘at every opportunity.’”3  The Democratic 
Party had allied itself closely with the interests of domestic tobacco, sugar, and other 
agricultural producers who viewed Filipino goods as competition.  They were also 
backed by the considerable political influence of the Anti-Imperialist League.4 
The vying interests of the two parties created what political scientist David 
Steinberg termed “self-liquidating imperialism,” which espoused the dual doctrines of 
free trade and scheduled decolonization (at least officially) from the very beginning of 
American rule.5  The election of both a majority of democrats to the House of 
Representatives in March 1911 and of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency in 1913 
should be considered important turning points in Philippine colonial history as 
accelerated “decolonization” became more important to American policymakers.  
Democrats more intensely desired an accelerated timeline toward Filipino 
independence than Republicans. 
This meant that major changes needed to happen regarding the colonial 
infrastructure of the archipelago—Filipinos needed to replace US officials in the 
                                                 
2 This idea that Muslims and other non-Christian tribes were lower on the scale of civilization is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.  This narrative would later become internalized by Christian 
Filipinos who began to more universally see their Muslim counterparts as behind in development and 
inferior. 
3 Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920 
(Quezon City: University of the Philippines System press, 1977), 257. 
4 Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 89. 
5 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 89. 
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colonial government and be given greater authority in the affairs of the islands.  For 
their part, Filipinos had to prove that they were capable of administering their own 
government.  In addition, minority groups in the archipelago had to be acceptably 
“assimilated” into the main body politic in order to overcome American reservations 
regarding the status of the these groups. 
David Barrows, a professor of political science at the University of California 
who had served as superintendent of schools in Manila from 1900-1901, as Chief of 
the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes of the Philippines from 1901-1903, and as 
Director of Education for the colony between 1903 and 1909, published A Decade of 
American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913, an influential work read and 
cited by Americans and Filipinos alike.  His work provides valuable insight into how 
Americans felt about the colonial mission to the Philippines and what the newly 
elected administration meant for Filipino policy. 
Barrows writes that “the distinctive achievement of the American 
administration in the Philippines is in the social and spiritual transformation of the 
Filipinos themselves: the pains to make better men.  American claims of contributing 
to the world’s experience in the governance of empire lie in the personal and political 
liberty guaranteed to the Filipinos and in the success of popular education.”6  While 
his praise for the success of popular education seems self-serving given his previous 
experience as director of education in the archipelago, his articulation of America’s 
contribution to the “world’s experience” in the governance of empire [i.e. colonialism] 
and their ability to transform the Filipinos into “better men” is directly in line with 
                                                 
6 David Barrows, A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913 (New York: 
Yonkers-on-Hudson World Book Company, 1914), 59-60. 
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official discourse.  American colonialism was defended as serving a social mission 
that transformed those it touched and ironically “gave” liberty to those colonized.   
This understanding of American colonialism is important because U.S. 
Democrats put Filipinos in semi-imperial positions of authority over predominantly 
Muslim regions.  Barrows writes that in 1913 “the vacant parts of the Moro Province 
would be colonized by Filipinos and the effort made to assimilate the Moros into the 
Filipino nation.  To the place at the head of the Executive Bureau was appointed the 
Attorney-General, Judge Ignacio Villamor.”7  Filipinos were put in charge of the 
majority of the colonial infrastructure in the newly formed Department of Mindanao 
and Sulu and became a new colonial force in the archipelago.  There was thus an 
internal colonization of the American colony as Filipinos, now dominant in the 
legislature, formulated policy in order to “assimilate” Muslims into the body politic 
and “civilize” them.   
This was in contradiction to what Barrows recognized as the wishes of the 
Muslim populace.  He wrote that “whatever the future of these Moro peoples, policy 
would seem to dictate their being left to unhampered American authority.  That this, 
rather than Filipino government, is their own preference was sufficiently indicated by 
the passionate statements of several Moro datus to Secretary Dickinson on his visit to 
Samboanga in 1910.”8  One must approach Barrows’ claim with skepticism.  The 
statements of the datus’ may not necessarily have reflected the desires of Muslims 
more generally. 
                                                 
7 Barrows, A Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 65. 
8 Ibid. 
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Barrows’ claim is still significant, however, in that it expresses American 
reservations concerning Filipino capacity to peacefully integrate and administer the 
Muslim tribes of the archipelago, which became a frequent topic in debates about the 
colony’s independence within American political and academic circles, and speaks to 
the importance of Mindanao and the Muslim tribes to the formation of the Philippine 
nation-state.  The stakes for the Filipino elite to prove their capability to administer 
their own affairs and assimilate their minorities were high—if they failed, not only 
would that possibly delay their independence, but it might also jeopardize their ability 
to maintain the territorial integrity of the colony as American policymakers in favor of 
controlling Mindanao separately would be given ammunition. 
While Chapter Two focused on the role of the Muslims in the construction of 
Filipino national identity in the early 1900s, this chapter focuses on the period from 
1913-1921 and discusses the Filipino takeover of Mindanao and the claims that the 
most powerful Filipino politicians, Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Quezon among them, 
made concerning the Province’s progress—claims that reflected the perceived ability 
of the Filipinos to accomplish American goals better than the Americans themselves.  
This chapter will argue not only that Filipinos resembled a colonial power under an 
encouraging U.S. Democratic administration that looked favorably upon the colony’s 
independence, but also that the progress Filipinos claimed to make was one strikingly 
American in appearance.  This progress included the division of church and state, the 
expansion of education, improvements in public health, the development of resources, 
and the formulation of land policy.  Filipinos perceived that their best chance for 
independence was to convince the United States that they were capable of self rule and 
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their best means for proving this was to model the United States.  While current 
scholarship focuses more on American relations vis-à-vis Filipino politicians, such as 
Glenn May’s Social Engineering in the Philippines, or American relations with the 
Muslims, such as Peter Gowing’s American Mandate in Moroland, this chapter will 
bring into focus the agency of Filipinos in colonial state building in Mindanao.  Since 
the southern regions of the Philippines had become one of the major roadblocks to 
Filipino independence, I will argue that Filipino elite ultimately used the Muslim 
regions and their inhabitants to showcase their achievements in their quest for 
independence. 
The chapter provides a background to Filipinization and its impact on 
governance of Mindanao.  It shows how Philippine Commission member Vicente 
Ilustre’s 1914 Act modernized Muslim governance and discusses the impact of the 
Jones Bill of 1916 that replaced it.  Since the Jones Bill finally brought the Muslim 
and non-Christian regions of the archipelago into the legislative domain of both the 
newly named Senate (formerly the Philippine Commission) and the House of 
Representatives (formerly the Philippine Assembly), Filipino Christians gained more 
influence in the affairs of the Muslim and non-Christian regions.  I then treat the 
claims Filipino politicians made regarding education, public health, public works, 
resource development, and land policy.  These claims are highlighted in a report 
written by La Misión Parlamentaria Filipina, an independence mission sent by the 
Philippine Legislature to the United States Congress and President in 1922.  This 
report is valuable in seeing Filipino claims for progress made as the Misión was 
composed of the most powerful and influential politicians in the Philippine Islands, 
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including Sergio Osmeña (president of the House of Representatives) and Manuel 
Quezon (president of the Senate).   
Although the Misión argues that it represents the views of the Filipino people 
generally, there were dissenters.  Moreover, the opinion of the majority of the 
archipelago’s inhabitants is difficult if not impossible to decipher and cannot be 
gleaned from this petition.  However, it remains a valuable piece because it came from 
a large, powerful bloc of influential Filipino politicians, was addressed to and received 
by the United States Congress and President, and was even answered by President 
Harding. 
By focusing on the claims of Filipino politicians, this chapter is not intended to 
capture the responses of the Muslims.  Some saw advantage in the Filipino takeover 
and allied themselves with the new administration while others continued resisting.  
Filipinos continued to actively define their Muslim counterparts and argue that 
Filipinos were more suitable to administer them over Americans since they not only 
had the “privilege” of Western contact and Christian training, but that they shared the 
same racial stock with Muslims.  How Filipino politicians dealt with Muslim 
resistance to inclusion in a Christian Filipino-led Philippines, however, is treated in 
more detail in Chapter Four. 
Background to Filipinization 
Before discussing how Filipino politicians claimed to be capable of 
modernizing and civilizing their Muslim counterparts, one must first understand how 
they went from being minor participants in colonial governance to the majority 
members of both houses of the legislature and the top executives in several 
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departments.  Through a process dubbed Filipinization, which began in earnest in 
1913, Filipinos assumed control of a greater percentage of the colonial infrastructure.  
This section will describe the impact of the transition from a Republican-dominated 
insular government to one dominated by U.S. Democrats who implemented the 
transition from American to Filipino control of the majority of government public 
offices. 
The first significant step taken to Filipinize the government occurred with 
Wilson’s decree that Filipinos would occupy a majority of the Philippine Commission 
and Assembly.  Originally established by the Cooper Act of 1902, also known as the 
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Philippine Commission was the supreme lawmaking body 
of the islands and was composed entirely of appointees made by the United States 
President.  The lower lawmaking body was composed of elected Filipino officials 
whose legislation was subject to approval by the Commission.  Once the Wilson’s 
decree was announced, the entire commission either resigned or was dismissed, with 
the exception of prominent Filipino nacionalista Rafael Palma.  President Wilson then 
appointed the following Americans: Clinton L. Riggs, a personal friend active in 
Maryland politics; Henderson S. Martin of Kansas; and Winfred T. Denison, who 
hailed from New York City and had served as assistant attorney general in the Taft 
administration.9 
In order to choose Filipinos suitable for appointment to the Commission, 
Governor-general Harrison asked Sergio Osmeña, then Speaker of the Filipino 
Assembly, for a list of recommendations.  From the twelve provided, Harrison 
                                                 
9 Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1998), 174. 
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appointed Nacionalista Vicente Ilustre, a prominent revolutionary of 1896-98; 
nonpolitical jurist Victorino Mapa; Nacionalista Jaime de Veyra, former governor of 
Leyte and member of the Assembly; and Progresista Vicente Singson Encarnacion to 
join Rafael Palma on the Commission.10  Filipinos had secured a powerful bloc in the 
highest legislative body of the archipelago. 
Having guaranteed them control of both houses of the Legislature (the 
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly) on the President’s behalf, 
Harrison then embarked on a campaign to remove largely Republican-appointed 
bureaucratic officials and replace them with Filipinos.  In addition to advancing the 
archipelago’s autonomy, there was a significant difference in pay between salaries 
paid to Americans (set high as an incentive to bring American talent to the Islands) 
and those of Filipinos (set in line with salaries paid by local corporations), which 
meant a net savings to the insular government with each replacement, especially 
among the highest executives.  Harrison’s tenure was marked by what even he termed 
“an exodus of Americans from government service into private business.”11 
Certainly, his support and enforcement of a regulation put into effect in 
December, 1913, “absolutely prohibiting government officials and employees from 
engaging in private business enterprises,” greatly contributed to this exodus.12  
Colonial policy until that time had promoted the outside business activities of colonial 
careerists in order to encourage development when it became clear that the flow of 
                                                 
10 Golay, Face of Empire, 175. 
11 Harrison, Corner-Stone,84. 
12 Golay, Face of Empire, 175. 
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American capital and enterprise to the colony was much smaller than expected.13  This 
was a major perk as American officials generally possessed the capital to purchase 
tracts of land rich in natural resources and to make investments in industries that they 
viewed as important to the colony’s economy, such as sugar and insular mining.  Such 
a policy, however, held the potential for abuse of power and conflicts of interest in 
establishing colonial law as officials could manipulate the laws to benefit their private 
commercial interests.  The new administration thus ended a profitable practice for 
Americans begun towards the end of Governor-general Taft’s administration.   
Harrison wrote that “a number of the office-holders elected to keep their business and 
retire from the public service. They have in general made a genuine success in 
business, and are now thankful for the step then taken.”14  
 In addition to this new regulation, Harrison also cut executive salaries and held 
government officials accountable for safeguarding the interests of the Filipino people.  
Early in his term, he requested that the director of the Bureau of Lands, Charles H. 
Sleeper, resign since he had been responsible for the sale of large tracts of unoccupied 
friar lands to corporations on the grounds that this was “in contravention to the wishes 
of the Filipino people.”  He appointed Manuel Tinio, a Filipino, to fill his place.  This 
then caused the resignation of the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Lands, an 
American named John R. Wilson, who stated that “he would not serve under a 
Filipino.”15 
                                                 
13 Golay, Face of Empire, 138. 
14 Harrison, The Cornerstone, 84. 
15 Ibid., 78. 
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 Filipinization cannot be entirely attributed to the efforts of Governor-General 
Harrison alone.  The prospect of World War I lured many patriots to leave the 
archipelago and fight for the United States.  Filipino politicians, being the primary 
beneficiaries of Filipinization, also contributed to the process with the passage of the 
Osmeña Retirement Law in 1915, which allowed officials or employees with at least 
six years of services to apply for retirement, which carried a gratuity based on length 
of service that could be as high as one year’s pay.  Of the 1,064 Americans eligible for 
payment, all but fifty applied for it.16 
As Frank Golay writes, “when Harrison arrived in the Philippines, only two 
appointments at the level of chief or assistant chief of a bureau were held by Filipinos.  
When he departed in 1921, Filipinos held thirty out of the thirty-nine appointments at 
bureau chief rank and ‘virtually all’ assistant bureau chiefs were Filipinos.”17  
Filipinization of provincial and municipal governments also occurred.  By 1916, only 
twenty-seven Americans held positions in the provincial government (13 percent), and 
.66 percent in municipal government.18  Although the Filipinization of the colonial 
government occurred in territories throughout the archipelago, governance of the 
Moro Province was especially affected. 
Modernizing Muslim Governance 
 
How did the Democratic administration affect the Moro Province specifically?  
To begin with, upon hearing that the Army had given orders to General Clarence 
                                                 
16 United States Congress, Senate, The Laws of the Third Philippine Legislature during Its Fourth 
Session….,  64th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917), Act no. 2657, 
section 2589, 685. 
17 Golay, Face of Empire, 208. 
18 Ibid., 208. 
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Edwards to take over as the new governor of the province, Governor-General Harrison 
protested and with the support of General Pershing and the previous Governor-
General, William Cameron Forbes, was able to have Edwards’ orders cancelled.  He 
then appointed Frank Carpenter as the first civilian governor of the Muslim regions, 
which previously had been administered under the army officers Leonard Wood, 
Tasker H. Bliss, and John J. Pershing.  Carpenter was widely respected as an able 
administrator and his transition to power was smooth.  Despite reductions in troop 
numbers, there were virtually no major Muslim uprisings during his tenure.  Five days 
after his appointment, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 2309, which 
changed the name of the Moro Province to the “Department of Mindanao and Sulu.” 
A civil governor in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu meant that the 
Filipino-controlled Commission could exercise a greater role in the territory without 
interference from the Army.  Although supervised by United States officials, Filipinos 
were encouraged to take more active roles under the democratic administration.   
Philippine Commission Act No. 2408, authored by the Honorable Vicente 
Ilustre, is the one of the earliest examples of Filipino sponsored legislation affecting 
the colonization of Mindanao.  The full title was “An Act Providing a Temporary 
Form of Government for the Territory known as the Department of Mindanao and 
Sulu, Making Applicable Thereto, With Certain Exceptions, the Provisions of General 
Laws Now in Force in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes.”  It was passed 
by the Commission on July 23, 1914.  The Preamble, reproduced below, shows clearly 
that Filipinos responded to American threats to divide the colony with measures 
patterned after American models to better unify the archipelago: 
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Whereas the change of government in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu 
effected in January last, necessitates certain reforms, and not only is the time 
ripe for these reforms, but they are insistently demanded by present conditions 
in said Department; and 
 
Whereas it is the desire of the people of the Islands to promote the most rapid 
moral, social, and political development of the inhabitants of said Department 
in order to accomplish their complete unification with the inhabitants of other 
provinces of the Archipelago; and 
 
Whereas for the accomplishment of this purpose the extension thereto of the 
general laws of the country and of the general forms and procedures of 
government followed in other provinces, under certain limitations in harmony 
with the special conditions now prevailing in said Department, is among other 
measures advisable and necessary, but always with understanding that such 
limitations are temporary and that it is the firm and decided purpose of the 
Philippine Commission to abolish such limitations together with the 
departmental government as soon as the several districts of said region shall 
have been converted into regularly organized provinces.19 
 
The idea that the “people of the islands,” referring to the inhabitants making up the 
majority of the archipelago (Christian Filipinos) would develop the Muslims and non-
Christians of Mindanao and Sulu morally, socially, and politically mirrors the colonial 
mission of the United States taken up with all the inhabitants of the Philippines in the 
early 1900s.  The colonial mission of the Filipinos regarding Mindanao thus has the 
same ideal as the sentiment of Professor Barrow’s statement—that the hallmark of 
Filipino-style colonialism would be the transformation of the Muslims into “better 
men” just as Americans had supposedly transformed the Filipinos. 
Significantly, the Act also mirrors American governance in that the 
“development” described acts as shorthand for Western-style modernization, which 
included creating institutions that were secular and deprived Muslim leaders of 
                                                 
19 United States War Department, Acts of the Third Philippine Legislature Third Session and of the 
Philippine Commission:  os. 2402 to 2530 inclusive (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1916), Act No. 2408, 14. 
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traditionally held rights.  The Muslim regions of the archipelago were initially 
organized by Philippine Commission Act No. 787, which was in force from 1903 until 
it was replaced by Ilustre’s Act in 1914, which recognized the importance of the datus, 
or tribal leaders, with the establishment of tribal wards.  Datus were put under the 
jurisdiction of the district governor and paid a stipend from the government for their 
services.  These services included the dispensation of justice in accordance with local 
laws as long as the defendants were Muslim or Pagan—cases between Christian 
Filipinos and Muslims or Pagans would be decided by the insular Court of First 
Instance.   
These local laws were often based on a set of written legal codes known as the 
Luwaran.
20
  These were first translated into English by Moro expert Najeeb M. 
Saleeby, the appointed Superintendent of Schools in the Moro Province who had 
studied and become fluent in several local languages.  The codes consisted of 
selections from customary (adat) law as well as selections from the Shafi’i school of 
Sunni Islamic law.  Saleeby commented that “the Moros are not strict nor just in the 
execution of the law.  The laws relating to murder, adultery, and inheritance are 
seldom strictly complied with…[and]  Moro law is not applied equally to all classes.  
Great preference is shown to the datu class.”21 
American colonial officials were unimpressed with these laws.  General Wood, 
the provincial governor of the Moro Province from 1903-1906 wrote that “nothing has 
been found worthy of codification, and little or nothing which does not exist in better 
                                                 
20 Translated as “selection” by Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 62. 
21 Najeeb M. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion (Manila: Department of the Interior, 
Ethnological Survey Publications, vol. IV, part 1, Bureau of Public Pritning, 1905), 66. 
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form wherever humane, decent and civilized laws are in force.”22  Wood was also 
concerned with the existence of two legal systems, local law (some mix of adat and 
Shaafi law) and the centralized laws of the insular government in Manila in the 
province, and in 1904 wrote that: 
…a continuation of this double system constitutes a great injustice, for under 
the present law if a Moro kills a Filipino or Christian of a degree of 
intelligence and social condition in every way approximating his own—
perhaps a neighbor living under exactly the same conditions—he receives the 
penalties prescribed by the criminal code in force in the Philippine Islands.  If 
he kills another Moro or non-Christian under exactly the same conditions, the 
maximum penalty which can be awarded him under the Moro or non-Christian 
laws is a fine of one hundred and five pesos.23 
 
Despite American complaints, it was not until the Philippine Commission passed the 
Organic Act for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, championed by Christian 
Filipino Commission member Vicente Ilustre, in 1914 that Philippine general insular 
law was put in force and that datus and others who had been raised under Islamic 
jurisprudence and adat law lost their traditional places as dispensers of justice.24  Their 
contributions to the justice system would become narrowly defined by Philippine 
Commission Act no. 2550, passed on April 3, 1915, which authorized the appointment 
of native law experts such as kalis (previous Moro judges—often also the datus) or 
Panditas (scholars in local Muslim law and jurisprudence) to serve as assessors to sit 
                                                 
22Leonard Wood, First Annual Report of Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. Army, Governor of the 
Moro Province (Zamboanga: Bureau of Printing, 1904), 9, as quoted in Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 
129.  
23Wood, First Annual Report, 17-18, as quoted in Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 129.  Wood seems 
unaware of the fact that this penalty of 105 pesos did not preclude retaliation from the victim’s family, 
relatives, and friends. 
24 It should be noted that Ilustre’s Act did not produce changes in the Muslim Community overnight—
Muslims still went to datus for justice.  However, the party disadvantaged by the datu’s decision could 
now bring his case to government officials.  Losing the ability to decide cases between Muslims and 
non-Christians meant that datus and panditas also lost a source of income in the form of fines charged 
on the party found guilty. 
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with courts in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.  According to Section 3 of the 
Act, provided both parties were Muslims, judges “might…modify the application of 
laws and customs; provided that such modification shall not be in conflict with the 
basic principles of the laws of the United States of America.”25  In practice, these 
modifications or exceptions to the general laws were narrowly confined to family law 
as occurred elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including Siam (now Thailand) and British-
controlled Malaya (now called Malaysia). .26  Maximo M. Kalaw, a professor at the 
University of the Philippines-Diliman, wrote in 1919 that: 
Possibly the most difficult task of the government has been the separation of 
the Church and State in the Moro country and the relinquishment of civil 
authority by the native chiefs in favor of the agents of the central government.  
In no other Mohammedan country has this ever been attempted.  From time 
immemorial governmental authority has been exercised by the prelates and 
clergy of the Mohammedan church in Sulu, Cotabato, Lanao, a large part of 
Zamboanga, and in those portions of the provinces of Bukidnon and Davao 
which are inhabited by Mohammedans.27 
 
 In addition to changing the power structure among Muslims that had 
traditionally been the agents of dispensing justice, the Act placed more power in the 
hands of the provincial governor by reclassifying the tribal wards as municipal 
districts.  The municipal districts have been described by Philippine Muslim historian 
Peter Gowing as a “rudimentary form of government (a skeleton of municipal 
government) designed to meet the needs of those areas where the majority of the 
inhabitants had not developed a sufficient degree of political sophistication desired by 
                                                 
25 M.B. Hooker, Islamic Law in South-East Asia (Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 229. 
26 Mohd. Musib M. Buat, “Legal Anchors,” In Search of Commonalities between Muslims and 
Christian Filipinos (Manila: Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication, 2002), ed. Florangel 
Rosario-Braid, 110.  
27 Maximo Kalaw, Self-Government in the Philippines (New York: The Century Co., 1919), 121. 
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the Government.”28  The municipal district had a president, vice-president, and 
councils for advisory purposes.  All of these officials were appointed by the Provincial 
Governor who was under no obligation to choose datus for these positions. 
 As provincial governor, Frank Carpenter followed a policy of Filipinization 
similar to that of Harrison.  Previous Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes wrote 
that: 
Carpenter actually preferred American-trained Filipino officials because of the 
difficulty of retaining high-class Americans who had a competent knowledge 
of local dialects and customs.  He saw that there was an unlimited supply of 
young Filipinos available for training whereas it was hard to attract and hold 
enough desirable Americans for public service in the Philippines….  
Moreover, the replacement of the unfit or incompetent Filipino was easier and 
involved less economic loss than in the case of an American.29 
 
He thus appointed Filipinos to many of the executive posts of the Moro Province, 
appointing only a tiny number of Muslims to serve alongside them, prompting many 
Muslims to call for “Moroization” and even send letters pleading for the former 
American administrators to return to them.30 
 The act that Ilustre authored demonstrates that Filipinos were responding to 
American threats by changing the governance of Mindanao in ways that mimicked 
American views on what constituted more progressive, modern forms of government.  
This included creating a more unified, secular justice system in response to criticism 
made by prominent American officials, including previous Provincial Governor 
General Wood.  By demoting datus and others from judges to merely consultants on 
local customs regarding family law (such as marriage, inheritance, and the divorce), 
                                                 
28 Gowing, Moro Province, 263. 
29W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), vol II, 33. 
30 The ways in which Filipinos dealt with such resistance will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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the act also changed the political currency of datus and panditas schooled in Islamic 
law since their expertise was now much more narrowly confined.  Their role as 
authorities in deciding cases between Muslims and non-Christians changed, and 
general insular law became enforced. 
Jones Law 
 
Ilustre’s Act was succeeded by the passage of the Jones Law of 1916 by the 
United States Congress, which had a tremendous effect on legislative control of the 
Muslim and other non-Christian regions of the archipelago.  The law was formally 
titled “An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States to the Future 
Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More 
Autonomous Government for Those Islands.”31  It abolished the Philippine 
Commission and Assembly and replaced them with a bicameral Philippine Legislature 
to be completely composed of Filipinos.  The Act fully incorporated the provinces 
inhabited by Muslims and other non-Christians into the nation-state, thus eliminating 
any difference in legislative control over the two territories.  The preamble of the act 
was particularly important to Filipino politicians.  It stated that: 
…it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency 
of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial 
aggrandizement; and  
…it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to 
withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their 
independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and 
…for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the 
hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic 
affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise 
of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by 
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the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may 
be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the 
privileges of complete independence….32 
 
The act reinforced the idea that Filipino policymakers had to prove that a stable 
government had already been established in the archipelago.  This included proof that 
the Muslims and other non-Christian tribes had been assimilated into the body politic. 
In order to facilitate this, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu became part of the 
12th senate district of the archipelago, which included the Mountain Province (an area 
in Luzon inhabited by a non-Christian majority), Baguio, and Nueva Vizcaya.  While 
the grouping of the other regions in the Philippines into 11 districts was due to 
geography given their close proximity to each other, the grouping of the regions in the 
12th district owed more to political reasons—the territories were not only not 
contiguous but quite varied in terms of resources and topography.  Two senators were 
to represent the entire district—such a grouping disadvantaged both the Muslim and 
other non-Christian groups as their representation in the Philippine Legislature was 
shared even though their interests may not have been. 
The Act also established a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, which Filipino 
lawmakers placed under the administration of the Secretary of the Interior, Vicente 
Ilustre, with the passage of Philippine Legislature Act no. 2674. 
This act empowered the Bureau to: 
foster by all adequate means in a systematic, rapid, and complete manner the 
moral, material, economic, social, and political development of the regions 
inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos, always having in view the action of 
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between and complete fusion of 
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all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the Provinces of the 
Archipelago.33 
 
While the election of Senators and representatives in other parts of the archipelago 
would be by popular suffrage, in the Muslim and non-Christian regions 
aforementioned, they were appointed by the Governor-general.   This insured that they 
would be sympathetic with American political goals in the islands. 
 The passage of the Jones Law and the creation of the Philippine Senate—to be 
composed of elected members rather than the appointed members that formerly 
formed the Philippine Commission—and the House of Representatives created 
opportunities for both Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña.  Manuel Quezon resigned 
from his post as Resident Commissioner to the United States and returned to the 
archipelago where he successfully ran for election to the Senate and was then elected 
Senate President.  Sergio Osmeña decided to remain in the lower legislative body 
where he became Speaker of the House. 
 
World War I 
 
American involvement in the archipelago’s affairs would lessen soon after the 
Jones Law due to the advent of United States participation in World War I.  Philippine 
historian Bernardita Churchill stated that “[Governor-General] Harrison’s freedom of 
action in the administration of the Philippines was almost total, especially after 1917 
when American entry into World War I resulted in the Administration’s absorption in 
                                                 
33U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, Acts of the Philippine Legislature: Philippines; Laws of the Fourth 
Philippine Legislature…, 65th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Executive Document 124 (Washington, DC: 
government Printing Office, 1918), 129. 
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more pressing matters than those of the far away colonial government.”34  As already 
discussed, Harrison was a firm believer in letting Filipinos run their own affairs; just 
as Harrison enjoyed greater freedom in office, so too did Filipino politicians.  
Reflecting on the war and the policy adopted by Filipinos to “bring Filipinos and 
Moros into friendly relationship, in order to bring about mutual assimilation,” Director 
of the Philippine Press Bureau Vicente Bunuan wrote in 1927 that: 
So successful was this policy of bringing the two peoples into brotherly 
relationship that when America entered the World War in 1917 it was not 
considered dangerous to withdraw not only the American soldiers stationed 
there but also the Philippine Scout garrisons with the exception of one 
battalion stationed at Petit Barracks at Zamboanga.  This is what the Filipinos 
can do if they are allowed to handle the Moro question unhampered; that is 
what they will do when they become independent in dealing with the Moro 
problem.”35 
 
The claims that Filipino politicians made concerning the assimilation of the 
Muslims and other non-Christian tribes from roughly 1914 to 1921 can be seen in 
 uestra Demanda de la Libertad, co-authored by members of La Misión 
Parlamentaria Filipino in 1922—after the election of Republican Warren G. Harding 
to the US Presidency.  The work is significant to Philippine historiography in several 
ways.  To begin with, La Misión was composed of several prominent politicians, 
including Manuel Quezon (president of the Philippine Senate and appointed president 
of the Mission) and five other senators; Sergio Osmeña (Speaker of the Philippine 
House) and 8 other Representatives; Secretary of the Interior Teodoro M. Kalaw; 
Director of Lands Jorge Vargas; four professors from the University of the 
                                                 
34 Bernardita Reyes Churchill, The Independence Missions to the United States, 1919-1934 (Manila: 
National Historical Institute, 1983), 7-8. 
35 Vicente G. Bunuan, Democracy in the Philippines, (Washington DC: Philippine Press Bureau, 1927), 
28.  Bunuan was director of the Philippine Press Bureau, Washington Office of the Philippine 
Commission of Independence. 
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Philippines, and several others.  The members of the Misión were appointed by a joint 
committee that had been created as a response to the change in American 
administration and the publication of the Wood-Forbes Report, which pointed out 
mistakes of the Harrison Administration, including the inadequate treatment and care 
of cultural minorities.36  The Misión was tasked to work for Philippine independence 
and to present the Filipino view regarding issues affecting the archipelago.  The fact 
that the Misión was received by President Harding, and their memorial addressed to 
the United States Congress and President was answered by Harding proves that the 
memorial was influential and had an important audience.  An entire section of the 
report focuses on the Muslim and non-Christian tribes, which is especially relevant to 
this study.                   
Education 
 
The Misión memorial’s treatment of education reveals how Filipinos attempted 
to prove that they were capable of self-governance based on their ability to educate 
and civilize peoples they considered inferior.  According to the memorial: 
The progress realized since the establishment of the civil administration [in 
1913] have been so great that one would need several pages to enumerate them 
in a detailed fashion.  As concerns labor, the Christian Filipinos have sacrificed 
men and money in order to civilize their non-Christian brothers and elevate 
them to his own level.37 
 
                                                 
36 Bernardita Reyes Churchill, The Independence Missions to the United States, 1919-1934 (Manila: 
National Historical Institute, 1983), 35-37. 
37 Manuel Quezon, Sergio Osmeña and the Philippines Parliamentary Mission to the United States, 
1922.   uestra demanda de libertad: memorial Filipino al presidente y congreso de los Estados 
Unidos: resumen del problema Filipino y exposición de las actuales condiciones de las islas (Manila: 
Bureau of Printing, 1923), 127.  The original reads: Los progresos realizados desde el establecimiento 
de la administración civil han sido realmente tan grandes que necesitarían muchas páginas para 
enumerarlos detalladamente.  En aras de esta labor, los filipinos cristianos han sacrificado hombres y 
dinero para civilizar a sus hermanos no cristianos y elevarlos a su propio nivel.  My translation.  All 
translations are mine unless stated otherwise.   
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The authors here highlight the sacrifice Filipinos have made to educate their brothers.  
They continue by citing statistics in order to demonstrate “the progress reached in the 
non-Christian regions [including the Muslim regions] in Mindanao and Sulu since 
control of the government was given to Christian Filipinos.”38  They then present a 
table demonstrating this progress, reproduced below.39 
1) Number of Schools, Teachers, and Enrolled Students in the Department of 
Mindanao and Sulu by Year, 1914-1921 
Year 
(Año) 
Number of Schools in 
Operation 








1914 157 311 14800 
1915 180 373 16019 
1916 A* A* A*40 
1917 292 613 25167 
1918 372 772 32438 
1919 468 1049 41179 
1920 606 1261 53096 
1921 690 1452 61187 
 
Now, one should be careful to not read the number of students matriculated as the 
number of Muslims and non-Christians enrolled because: 
In the beginning, the old Mahommedan chiefs and panditas openly announced 
that they were against their children attending government schools, considering 
this measure as an infraction of the agreement that the government sealed with 
them as concerning their religion, habits, and customs.  However, this 
difficulty was resolved in an entirely satisfactory manner thanks to the tact of 
the education authorities and the cooperation of the provincial, municipal, and 
other interested authorities.41 
                                                 
38 Quezon,  uestra Demanda, 125.  Original reads: el progreso alcanzado en la porción no cristiana de 
Mindanao y Sulú desde que se dio el control del gobierno a los filipinos cristianos. 
39 Quezon,  uestra Demanda, 125. 
40 No explanation is provided for the missing data for 1916. 
41 Quezon,  uestra Demanda, 126.  The original reads:  Al principio los viejos jefes y panditas 
mahometanos se pronunciaron abiertamente en contra de la asistencia de sus hijos a las escuelas del 
gobierno, considerando esta medida como una infracción del convento que el gobierno celebrara con 
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When colonial schools were established, many of the students were actually Christians 
whose parents had more faith in the institutions than their Muslim counterparts.  
However, the report does specifically mention the increased enrollment in the later 
years, stating that “one calls attention to the fact that the matriculated students in 1913 
were almost all Christians, while the notable increase in 1921 represents an increase in 
the number of matriculated Mahommedans and Pagans.”42 
The fact that this information appears in a report whose express purpose was to 
demand liberty from the United States Congress and President attests to the fact that 
Filipino politicians perceived that educating and civilizing “their” minorities would 
prove their capacity to be autonomous, especially since they could draw comparisons 
to what the Filipinos were able to accomplish versus what Americans had 
accomplished during U.S. Army rule.  Following this line of reasoning, Filipinos 
omitted the fact that the Secretary of Public Instruction was still an American and 
instead took credit themselves for increases in enrollment.  The majority of teachers 
were, after all, Filipinos, and it was largely the Filipino authorities that the report cites 
as being able to pacify Muslim fears and thus increase the enrollment of 
Mohammedans43 and other non-Christians. 
                                                                                                                                            
ellos en lo tocante a su religión, hábitos y costumbres.  Sin embargo, esta dificultad se solucionó de 
modo enteramente satisfactorio gracias al tacto de las autoridades del ramo educativo y a la 
cooperación de las autoridades provinciales y municipales y otras autoridades interesadas. 
42   uestra Demanda, 126.  Original reads: se llama la atención al hecho de que los estudiantes 
matriculados en 1913 eran casi todos cristianos, mientras que el notable aumento de 1921 representa 
un incremento en el número de niños mahometanos y paganos matriculados. 
43One should pay close attention to the terms that the report uses to refer to the Islamized Filipinos: 
moro is notably absent, while the more politically correct term of mahometanos is used.  
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 Attention should also be paid to the type of training that the Muslims and non-
Christians received.  In his doctoral dissertation to the faculty of the State University 
of Iowa in 1920, Filipino Victoriano D. Diamonon wrote that the: 
The purpose of the government is to extend to them civilizing opportunities 
which will ultimately bring about complete fusion with their Christian 
brothers.  Efforts have been directed to public education….  The education 
extended to the non-Christian tribes is…vocational.  In the primary grades the 
pupils are trained in agriculture, and schools along the coast place emphasis 
upon the development of marine products, not only sea foods but industry in 
shells, pearls, and sponges….  The government has even done more than 
merely extend the ordinary curricula to the non-Christian tribes.  It is 
investigating the talents of these peoples with a view to developing them.  
Recently scholarships have been established in household industries, in 
nursing, in agriculture, in arts, and in trade and commerce.  The uncivilized 
peoples have broken down the barriers of the centuries and have gone forth 
even to the United States in search of further training.  The Philippine 
government is making a permanent investment which insures profit by 
encouraging these young people to prepare themselves to serve their own 
people.
44
  [Emphasis added] 
 
This passage from Diamonon is significant in that it positions the Filipino government 
as an entity capable of discovering talents unknown to the uncivilized Muslim people 
and developing them.  The fact that some privileged Muslims were able to make the 
costly journey to the United States to undergo further educational training is portrayed 
as representing a breakthrough in the “barriers of centuries”—a breakthrough that the 
Filipino government is able to produce.  Diamonon also cites the education of the 
Muslims as a permanent investment that the Filipino government is making because it 
is encouraging young Muslims to prepare themselves to serve their own people.  
Muslims are becoming “better men” through the educational system run by the 
Philippine government much as the Americans were able to transform the Filipinos 
                                                 
44 Victoriano D. Diamonon, The Development of Self-Government in the Philippine Islands (Iowa City: 
Iowa, 1920), 110. 
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themselves into “better men” according to Barrows.  The fact that this was accepted by 
Diamanon’s dissertation committee speaks to the degree to which this rhetoric was 
accepted among America’s academic community. 
 To appreciate the degree to which Filipinos perceived education to be 
important to their claims for independence, one must only look at the Wood-Forbes 
Mission, which was sent to the Philippines after the election of Republican President 
Warren G. Harding and published their report in 1921.  The following excerpt from 
the report is particularly illuminating: 
Public order is excellent throughout the islands, with the exception of minor 
disturbances in the Moro regions, due principally to energetic and sometimes 
overzealous efforts to hasten the placing of Moro children, especially girls, in 
the public schools, and to the too sudden imposition upon the disarmed 
Mohammedans of what amounts to an absolute control by Christian Filipinos.  
It is also due in part to failure to give adequate representation to local 
governments to Moros.45 
 
It would appear that the “tact” referred to by the Filipino politicians in  uestra 
Demanda de Libertad included the seeming coercion to place Muslim children in 
schools, Muslim girls in particular.  Such practices suggest that Filipino politicians 
engaged in unethical practices to increase the number of matriculated students that 
they could report the United States.  Given that American colonial officials attached so 
much significance to education, Filipinos in power knew that this would be an 
important barometer by which their success at “civilizing” (or colonizing) the Muslims 
                                                 
45 Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921,  24. 
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would be measured.46  Their capacity to do this, in turn, would prove their own 
abilities at self-government and autonomy. 
 Like the American colonizers before it, the Filipino government invested 
money in education as a means of assimilating the Muslim and non-Christian 
populations.  The number of schools established, teachers recruited, and students 
enrolled were used as proof to show that they were ready for independence—just as 
similar data was used by the American administration to prove that they were 
transforming the Filipinos into “better men.”  Highly educated Filipinos like 
Diamonon perceived Filipino-led government schools as capable of discovering 
talents in Muslims that Muslims were unaware they possessed and as capable of 
developing them.  However, the Wood-Forbes Report gives us valuable perspective of 
what this may have looked like on the ground with its description of unrest and of 
“overzealous” efforts to place Moro children, especially girls, in Filipino schools, 
presumably against their will.   
Public Health 
Just as Filipino politicians used education of the Muslims and non-Christian 
tribes to prove their capacity for self-government, so too did they draw attention to 
their efforts regarding public health in Mindanao.  Research regarding public health in 
the Philippines has largely glossed over public health efforts among the Muslims.  
Warwick Anderson, for example, justifies this exclusion in Colonial Pathologies: 
American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines, by stating that 
                                                 
46 For more on education in the Christian regions of the Philippines, see Glen Anthony May, Social 
Engineering in the Philippines.  May omits education in the Moro province of the Philippines. 
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“the so-called non-Christian tribes were regarded as irredeemable and therefore the 
province of anthropology, not medicine.”47 
Philippine specialist Frank Golay commented that: 
Filipino leaders were aware that in the eyes of many Americans their claims to 
greater government autonomy were flawed by their lack of experience in 
dealing with public health problems, and…the legislature had authorized the 
reorganization of the insular Public Health Service and transferred it to the 
Department of the Interior headed by Rafael Palma.48  
 
Filipino politicians devoted money to improve the public health of the Muslim and 
other non-Christian regions of the archipelago, most likely out of a desire to not only 
showcase their abilities for autonomy but also to implement beneficial health reforms 
for the Muslims.  Whether motivated by political and/or charitable reasons, Filipino 
politicians made sure to highlight their accomplishments in their report to the United 
States.  They stated that: 
Great progress has been realized in the service of sanitation and health with the 
establishment of new hospitals and dispensaries, the first under the immediate 
direction of doctors and qualified surgeons, and then the later ones under the 
direction of graduated nurses and practitioners.49 
 
These establishments were considered successes not only for the improvements in 
health.  Indeed:  
                                                 
47 Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the 
Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 238.  Despite this exclusion, Anderson’s work is 
admirable and significant to our understanding of the interplay between the practice of colonialism and 
that of medicine in the Philippines.  His discussion of the racialization of germ theories which 
contrasted “a clean, ascetic Amercan body with an open, polluting Filipino body” is fascinating, and, 
hopefully, he will write about public health imperialism in the Muslim regions of the archipelago in 
more detail in the future. 
48Golay, Face of Empire, 208  
49
 uestra Demanda de Libertad, 128.  Original reads: En el servicio de sanidad se han realizado 
progresos halagüeños con el establecimiento de nuevos hospitales y dispensarios, los primeros bajo la 
dirección inmediata de médicos y cirujanos cualificados, y los últimos bajo la dirección de enfermeras 
graduadas y de practicantes. 
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The importance and value of the work realized by personal health and 
sanitation during the last years cannot be exaggerated if one looks not only 
from the point of view of the medical treatment that it facilitates, but rather 
from other points of view of no lesser importance, especially that of the 
establishment of control and amiable relations between the government and the 
Mohammedan and Pagan population. 50 
 
The Misión highlighted the presence of women at such establishments in order to 
vouch for the Muslims’ acceptance of these institutions: 
In the beginning, the Mahommedans and Pagans were suspicious and were 
resisting going to the hospitals for their medical treatment; but this attitude was 
transformed rapidly into a sense of acceptance and appreciation for the 
facilities provided for in the hospitals, even to the surprising extent that women 
from good families today request to be admitted in such establishments. 51 
 
No statistics are provided to attest to the frequency of visiting patients or the number 
of dispensations issued.  One can suspect, however, that the reaction among the 
populace to the advent of Western medicine in the region, was not universal 
acceptance as reliance on traditional healers and methods for resolving health issues 
continues even to the present day. 
Public Works 
Along with improving the governance of Mindanao, increasing the enrollment 
of the Muslims and the other non-Christian tribes in school, and establishing hospitals 
and dispensaries, Filipino politicians also funded public works in non-Christian areas 
and referenced these in their demands for independence.  The Misión wrote that: 
                                                 
50  uestra Demanda de Libertad¸ 128.  Original reads: La importancia y valor de la obra realizada por 
el personal de sanidad durante los últimos años no pueden ser exagerados si se mira no solamente 
desde el punto de vista del tratamiento médico que se facilita, sino desde otros puntos de vista de no 
menor importancia, especialmente el del establecimiento del control y relaciones amistosas del 
gobierno con la población mahometana y pagana. 
51  uestra Demanda de Libertad, 128.  Original reads: Al principio los mahometanos y paganos 
andaban recelosos y se resistían a ingresar en los hospitales para su tratamiento médico; pero esta 
actitud se transformó rápidamente en un sentimiento de aceptación y aprecio de las facilidades 
proporcionadas en los hospitales, hasta el extremo sorprendente de que mujeres de buenas familias 
solicitan hoy ser admitidas en dichos establecimiento.    
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Referring to permanent improvements and public works, one can see that the 
construction of good highways and paths, the supply of potable water, the 
improvements of ports and the ease of loading and unloading, the installation 
of telephones, and the construction of public buildings have been given special 
attention…despite the inadequacy of local rents and the insufficient help of the 
insular government.52 
 
The insular government here refers to the office of the Governor-general and the 
American colonial officials—the fact that the report describes their help as insufficient 
highlights how much credit the report’s authors thought due to Filipino legislators for 
the progress made in the establishment of public works in the Muslim and non-
Christian regions of the archipelago.  Mentioning the inadequacy of local rents 
suggests that the Filipino politicians that authored the bill wanted to make sure that the 
audience of the petition (the President and the Congress of the United States) 
understood that it was through the investment of the colony’s highest level of 
government that such works were realized.  Christian Filipinos took charge of building 
public works characteristic of “civilized” countries, such as potable water and 
telephones, over a population with different cultures and values much in the same way 
as had the United States (and Spain previously although to a lesser extent) in years 
prior. 
Agricultural Development and Colonial Migration 
 
Aside from reforming Muslim governance, educating the Muslim and pagan 
populations, investing in the region’s public health, and constructing public works, 
                                                 
52  uestra Demanda, 127.  Original reads: En lo referente a mejoras permanentes y obras públicas, se 
puede decir que han recibido especial atención la construcción de buenas carreteras y veredas, el 
suministro de agua potable, las mejoras de puertos y las facilidades de carga y descarga, la instalación 
de teléfonos y la construcción de edificios públicos.  El siguiente cuadro demuestra el progreso 
realizado en este sentido, no obstante lo inadecuado de las rentas locales y la insuficiente ayuda del 
gobierno insular. 
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Filipinos also used the Muslims and Mindanao to prove their capacity for 
“developing” the region’s resources.  According to the Misión: 
Regarding agriculture, we have spent special attention to the cultivation of 
food products.  We have established agricultural colonies in Cotabato in order 
to unite the Christian Filipinos and Mohammedans and to increase the 
production of rice and other foodstuffs.53 
 
The report also goes on to detail the number of hectares cultivated and the particular 
food grown.  This included rice, corn, coconuts, peanuts, and sweet potatoes.  
However, the total area cultivated actually decreased from 1915 to 1921, which is 
explained as a result of failed harvests due to floods and locusts.54  Similarly, the 
production of certain foodstuffs also decreased, including rice, peanuts, and sweet 
potatoes.  If the table shows such unimpressive results, why bother to include them?  
Despite the attention paid to the two agricultural products that experienced an increase 
in cultivation—corn and coconuts—the decreases seem only to demonstrate the 
challenges Filipinos faced in increasing food productivity and demonstrating their 
capabilities.  The inclusion of these results most likely speaks to the writers’ 
awareness of the expectations of their audience—if they had left out the chart 
recording progress on their attempts at agricultural development, this would be a 
glaring omission and were compelled to include it.  This is one example of how the 
expectations of the United States government preconfigured the ways in which 
Filipinos requested their independence—and suggests that the colonial actions 
regarding the Muslims and the non-Christian tribes on the part of Filipino lawmakers 
                                                 
53
 uestra Demanda, 126.  Original reads: En punto a agricultura se ha prestado especial atención al 
cultivo de productos alimenticios.  Se han establecido colonias agrícolas en Cotabato para unir a los 
filipinos cristianos y mahometanos y aumentar la producción del arroz y de otros alimentos.   
54  uestra Demanda, 126. 
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were also heavily influenced by their perception of what Americans would approve of 
and label “progress.” 
 In order to improve the Department of Mindanao and Sulu’s agricultural output 
and develop the resources of the regions, the government also needed to increase the 
laborers willing to do the work.  Christian Filipinos were encouraged by the 
government to move south to find work and resettle, especially those in heavily 
populated areas.  In fact, “in 1917 the Philippine government passed an appropriation 
of 100,000 pesos to aid such inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas who might desire to 
immigrate to the southern islands either to acquire land or seek employment.”55 
 The Misión gives us an idea of how many people moved with government 
encouragement.  They explicitly list the number of “colonists, including men, women, 
and children” (número de colonos incluyendo hombres, mujeres y niños) that moved to 
Cotabato (one region of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu) for the years 1915, 
1917, 1919, 1920, and 1921.  This number totaled comes out to 16,458 colonists 
resettled due to government encouragement.  The total number of Christian migrants 
to the rest of the Muslim regions in Mindanao, however, puts this figure higher given 
certain pull factors in the region, such as expanding economic opportunities, the 
availability of cheap land, the growth of industry, and the favorable climate. 
According to the Misión, one result worthy of mention: 
…has been the great success obtained in the relief procured upon the densely 
populated provinces like Cebu and both Ilocos [Ilocos del sur and del norte—
two provinces located in the north of Luzon].  The population excess of these 
provinces has been moved to the unpopulated regions of the province of 
Cotabato, rich in potential, where they have found ample room to unwind and 
                                                 
55 Diamonon, Development of Self-Government in the Philippine Islands, 110. 
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satisfy their legitimate ambition to be landowners and to find better 
recompense for their work.56 
 
This is one of the clearest examples of colonial behavior on the part of Christian 
Filipinos to address the problems the colony had with land reform.  The difficulty of 
average Filipinos to acquire land in certain parts of the islands was also continually 
noted by American policymakers as a serious problem to Filipino autonomy.  Looked 
at from this angle, the legítima ambición (legitimate ambition) that the Misión 
referenced shares remarkable similarities to the American Dream, except that Filipino 
policymakers were positioning themselves as the agents that made this dream come 
true for Filipino citizens where the Americans before could not. 
Diamonon opined that “this program will not only develop the resources of the 
south but will bring the two elements of Filipino people together as they never have 
been before and will thus abolish the tribal differences which have existed for ages.”57  
This settlement of the southern provinces was colonialism with the intent to assimilate 
the Muslim populations into the body politic.  Filipino policymakers and others 
seemed to tout the idea of assimilation as the motivation for their actions while 
profiting from the region’s resources.  Diamonon noted that: 
The action of the government in encouraging immigration to Mindanao is 
indeed laudable and should command support.  The island itself, second in size 
to Luzon, can produce sufficient food stuffs to supply the whole of the 
Philippines and export besides.  Forest and marine products abound, but how 
                                                 
56  uestra Demanda, 127.  Original reads: “ha sido el buen éxito obtenido en el alivio procurado a las 
provincias densamente pobladas como Cebú y ambos Ilocos [del sur y del norte].  El exceso de 
población de estas provincias se ha trasladado a las despobladas regiones de la provincia de Cotabato, 
ricas en potencia, donde han enconrado amplio campo para desenvolverse y satisfacer su legítima 
ambición de ser propietarios de terrenos y de hallar mejor recompensa a su trabajo.” 
57 Diamonon, 110.  The continual waves of migrant Filipinos into what was once majority Muslim 
Mindanao were often met with antagonism and resentment on the part of Muslims.  See Patricio 
Abinales, Making Mindanao : Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine  ation-State 
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000). 
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could these be utilized if the Mohammedan population were bitter foes to the 
Filipinos?”58 
 
Diamonon emphasizes the stakes—Filipino politicians recognized the importance of 
Mindanao and its resources to the archipelago as a whole.  While the Muslim and non-
Christian tribes provided the Filipinos with an opportunity to showcase their 
capabilities at building an educational system and civilizing their counterparts much in 
the same way Americans had done with the Christian Filipinos themselves, the land 
and resources of Mindanao were lauded as solutions to the overcrowding in certain 
parts of the islands, dependencies on other countries for food staples (including rice), 
and concerns regarding economic development.   
Conclusion 
 
With the Filipinization of the archipelago’s governance, the encouragement of 
the American Democratic administration, the passage of the Jones Bill in 1916, and 
the outbreak of World War I, Filipino politicians became the dominant players in 
Philippine affairs.  Despite being “colonized” themselves, they were put in power over 
minority groups in the archipelago considered less civilized and whose resources they 
coveted.  The ways they formulated policy and the claims they made to progress were 
colonial in character and American in appearance. 
Philippine Commission member Vicente Ilustre’s Bill in 1914 extended the 
general laws of the rest of the archipelago over the Muslim regions, creating a secular 
justice system that more closely resembled that of the United States.  In addition to 
changes in governance, Filipinos tried to prove their capacity for autonomy by 
showing that similar to what Americans claimed to have done before them, they too 
                                                 
58 Diamonon, 112. 
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could claim to educate other peoples and “investigate” their talents “with a view to 
developing them.”59  They took charge of improving public health in the Muslim and 
non-Christian provinces by building the institutions of “modern” medicine, including 
hospitals and dispensaries; acceptance of Western medicine was vouched for by the 
fact that women of the “best” families went to receive treatment.  Filipinos invested in 
constructing public works characteristic of “civilized” countries, such as the 
establishment of telephone lines and potable water.  They also posited that they could 
develop and increase the agricultural output of Mindanao and, in a clear display of 
colonialism, encouraged the migration of Christian Filipinos to Muslim areas of 
Mindanao, which they defended as a mechanism for bringing Christians and Muslims 
together and abolishing the differences between them. 
Democratic control of the United States Congress and Presidency afforded 
Filipino politicians unprecedented opportunities in formulating policy and 
“developing” the regions of the Muslim South.  The progress that they made was 
touted as proof of their capacity to be autonomous.  In the words of prominent 
Filipinos like Camilo Osias, former director of education, “it remained for the period 
when the Filipino people and Filipino officials had better control of their own affairs 
and of the non-Christian people to achieve the greatest work of uplift and of progress 
ever accomplished in the non-Christian territory and for the non-Christian people of 
the Philippines.”60  Osias continued, stating that “one of the great achievements of the 
Filipinos in the last few years is found in the great work of uplift and nationalization 
                                                 
59 Diamonon, 110. 
60Manuel Luis Quezon and Camilo Osias, Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause (Manila: 
Manila Book Company, 1924), 43.  
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of our Non-Christian brethren.”61  The Filipino elite used the progress of the Moro 
tribes as a measurement of their own accomplishments.   
Their bid for independence, however, was ultimately frustrated by Republican 
control of Congress and the Presidency.  Republicans pointed to the deficiencies of the 
colonial government, including the lack of sufficient press coverage to insure a sound 
public opinion, financial mistakes, delays in the administration of justice, the need for 
better teachers in both lower and higher institutes of learning, and “inadequate 
treatment and care of cultural minorities.”62  The appointment of Governor-General 
Leonard Wood, in particular, proved problematic given his first hand experience in the 
Philippines as Governor of the Moro Province and the attention he paid to Muslim 
reservations regarding Filipino assimilation.  The protests of Muslims and how 
Filipinos dealt with them will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
61 Quezon, Governor-General Wood, 82, 83. 




COLONIAL MOCKERY  
 
Mr. Speaker, the problem of governing the Moros and other non-Christian 
inhabitants of the Philippines is no way as serious as the issue of governing the 
Indians that the Americans found here in the first days of the Republic, and if 
the Filipinos were given the opportunity to take into their care their backwards 
brothers, they would show that this task [governing the Muslims] would not 
even be considered a problem.  In my opinion, there is less basis for suggesting 
that Muslim and non-Christian Filipinos be excluded from the control of the 
Philippine legislature than there is to suggest that the Indians of this country be 
excluded from the control of Congress, given that there is a greater 
commonality of interests and race between Christian and non-Christian 
Filipinos, on the one hand, than between Indian Americans and white 
Americans on the other.1 
 
 On October 12, 1914, Manuel Quezon, Filipino statesman and resident 
commissioner,2 argued with Senator Towner from Iowa who had suggested that a bill 
allowing for greater Filipino autonomy be amended so that it would exempt the 
Muslim and other non-Christian regions of the archipelago from Filipino political 
control.3  American politicians like Towner were aware of the tension that existed 
between Muslim tribes in the archipelago and their Christian counterparts, and were 
still debating a more distinct, separate administration for the Muslim regions.  The 
                                                 
1Manuel Luis Quezon, Discursos Del Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, Comisionado Residente de Filipinas, 
pronunciados en la cámara de representantes de los Estados Unidos con motivo de la discusión del bill 
Jones… (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1915), ed. William Atkinson Jones, 130-131, my translation.  The 
source text reads: 
Sr. Presidente, el problema de gobernar a los moros y otros habitantes infieles de Filipinas no 
es en modo alguno un asunto tan serio como la cuestión de gobernar a los indios que los 
americanos encontraron aquí en los primeros días de la República, y si a los filipinos cristianos 
se les diese la oportunidad de tomar a su cuidado a sus hermanos atrasados demostrarían que la 
tarea ni siquiera debería llamarse problema.  En mi opinión, hay menos fundamento para 
sugerir que los filipinos infieles sean excluido del control de la Legislatura Filipina que el que 
habría para sugerir que los indios de este país sean excluidos del control del Congreso, puesto 
que hay más comunidad de intereses y de raza entre los filipinos cristianos y los infieles, de 
una parte, que entre los indios americanos y los americanos blancos, de otra. 
2 Manuel Quezon would later become the first President of a semi-autonomous Philippine government 
in the early 1930s. 
3 The bill referred to here is the Jones Bill, which will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter. 
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Filipino elite, however, challenged American arguments regarding the direction of the 
colony, drawing uncomfortable comparisons using their knowledge of American 
history.  Like Quezon, they were quick to point out the colonial contradictions 
involved in American views on what the Philippines should look like—as these views 
were often based on idealized visions of the United States. 
In drawing a comparison between the Muslims of the Philippines and the 
indios (Native Americans), Quezon implicitly pointed out the hypocrisy of the idea 
that the Muslims should be outside the control of the Philippine legislature, or 
administered separately from the rest of the colony—after all, the United States 
exercised sovereignty over Native American tribes that were culturally distinct.  
Quezon used the Muslims to conceptually connect marginalized tribes of the 
archipelago with those in the United States, and positioned the Catholic Filipinos on a 
level with white (Protestant) Americans in the process. 
 His mention of a greater commonality of race between Filipinos and the 
Muslim and other non-Christian tribes than that which existed between White and 
indigenous Americans speaks to a larger strategy that Filipino politicians used to 
maintain the territorial integrity of the archipelago and to be granted greater autonomy.  
To begin with, such a move treats Christian Filipinos and Muslims as a monolithic, 
essentialized entity, expunging differences in geographic origin, language, profession, 
and class.  By stating that Christian and Muslim Filipinos have a particular racial stock 
in common, Quezon and other Christian contemporaries from the archipelago de-
emphasize differences among the Muslim, non-Christian, and Christianized peoples of 
the islands. 
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While Chapter 3 argued that elite Filipinos in effect became colonizers of 
Muslim Mindanao by asserting hierarchical difference between Christianized Filipinos 
and Muslims, this chapter will argue that just as they mimicked American colonialism, 
so too did they mock it by subverting US political and colonial ideology in order to 
challenge the American role as trustees in the training of Filipinos in democracy and 
self-governance.  Through an analysis of discourse related to independence made by 
important political figures of the era, namely Manuel Quezon, Camilo Osias, Vicente 
Bunuan, and Jose Melencio, I show how the elite largely denied and sidestepped the 
Muslim reservations and resistance that were cited by Americans officials.  In 
defending Philippine policy and relations toward the Muslims, the Filipino elite 
subverted American political ideology and challenged American claims that the 
United States’ primary purpose in the archipelago was to train Filipinos in democratic 
governance until they were ready to govern themselves.4  They ultimately used the 
language of US democracy and colonialism to challenge and redefine the American 
colonial mission as well as to defend their actions toward their Muslim counterparts. 
Muslim resistance to Filipino encroachment 
Before discussing how Filipinos addressed Muslim resistance and American 
reservations with Filipino rule of Muslim areas, a brief overview of the ways in which 
Muslims responded to increasing Filipino involvement in their affairs is necessary.  It 
should be recalled that the term Muslim is applied to the ethnic groups referred to as 
Moro in Spanish and American colonial records.5  These groups included several 
                                                 
4 Chapter 3 focuses on the varied ways that Filipino politicians mimicked American colonial policy. 
5 In some American sources, the term “Mohammedan” is also used.   
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tribes in the southern regions of the archipelago, including the Tausug in Sulu, the 
Yakan in Basilan, and the Magindanao, Samals, and Maranao in Mindanao. 
Although Spanish and American officials lumped together all of these groups 
under the term Moro, these tribal groups neither identified with this label nor thought 
of themselves as a unified religious entity until much later during the American 
colonial period.6  In the case of certain Muslim groups, notably the Tausug in Sulu, 
relations with their northern counterparts involved piracy and raids of coastal towns 
where Christian Filipinos were generally unarmed and easily taken as slaves.  
Commerce among the different groups revolved more around trade connections with 
Singapore than Manila.  The fact that Muslim datus felt little connection to the 
Christianized tribes of the north is also evidenced by the fact that they ignored pleas 
from revolutionary Christian Filipinos in the north for aid in their rebellion against the 
Spanish regime in the late 1800s. 
Spanish penetration of the Muslim regions of Mindanao and Sulu was 
relatively superficial and became significant only toward the end of the 1800s, owing 
largely to the advent of steamships and other technological advances.  Due to the 
trouble that the Spanish had in subduing the region, American legislators decided that 
the Muslim regions merited special colonial policies separate from the rest of the 
                                                 
6 In the early formation of the Philippine state, however, both Christian Filipinos and Americans made 
references to the moros of the islands, regardless of community affiliation.  For this reason, these 
communities will be collectively referred to as Muslim.   For more information about the formation of a 
collective Muslim identity among Philippine Muslims, see Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and 
Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998).  McKenna’s account seems far more plausible than the one offered by John D. 
Harbor, “Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: The Case of Moro Identity” (Master’s 




archipelago.  Political scientist Patricio Abinales writes that “not one but two distinct 
processes of colonial state formation occurred in the first decade of American rule.”7  
The Sulu archipelago and the Muslim regions of Mindanao became the Moro 
Province, placed under United States Army control until the advent of civil rule in 
1913.  Resistance was scattered and unity never emerged among the various Muslim 
tribal leaders, or datus.8  There was thus never a unified response from a “Moro 
Mindanao.”   
To further complicate attempts to understand the responses of the local 
populations in Mindanao, written testimonies from Philippine Muslims in the early 
1900s are rare.  Abinales contends, however, that “their constant appeals to make 
Moro Mindanao separate from the rest of the colony or to continue Army rule suggest 
their support for the Army’s position [that Moro Mindanao was unstable and prone to 
explode in rebellion if controlled by Filipinos].”9  Literature from this time period 
corroborates this point of view; Professor David Barrows, former chief of the Bureau 
of Non-Christian tribes from 1901-1903, alluded to the “passionate statements of 
several Moro datus to Secretary Dickinson on his visit to Samboanga in 1910” that 
indicated that “this [American authority], rather than Filipino government, is their own 
preference.”10 
                                                 
7 Patricio N. Abinales, “Progressive-Machine Conflict in Early-Twentieth Century U.S. Politics and 
Colonial State building in the Philippines,” in The American Colonial State: Global Perspectives, ed. 
Julian Go and Anne L. Foster (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003), 148-181. 
8 Patricio Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines:  A Comparative 
Historical Overview,” East-West Center Working Papers: Politics and Security Series, No.7, October 
2004, 3. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 David Prescott Barrows, Decade of American Government in the Philippines, 1903-1913 (New York: 
Yonkers-on-Hudson World Book Company, 1914), 59. 
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 Democratic control of the United States Congress and the Presidency, 
however, led to Filipinization of the colonial government, the establishment of civil 
rule in the newly named Department of Mindanao and Sulu and, eventually, the full 
integration of the Muslim regions into the legislative control of the Philippine 
Congress with the passage of the Jones Law in 1916.  The law grouped non-Christians 
and Muslims in the 12th district of the archipelago, and section 124 stipulated that the 
“the territory to be comprised in the representative districts of the Mountain Province 
and Department of Mindanao and Sulu shall be determined by the Governor-
General.”11  No rationale is given for this modification, and the Jones Law stipulated 
earlier in the Act in Section 22 that members in the legislature from these areas were 
to be appointed.  This section created a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, which was to 
have “general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants of the territory 
represented in the legislature by appointive senators and representatives” (emphasis 
added).12  The inspiration for such a stipulation could have been many things, 
including a limited electorate (voters had to either own property or be able to read and 
write in Spanish, English, or a native language) and general distrust of the integrity of 
elections if held in the region.  The result though was clear--while other districts 
enjoyed full suffrage, the Muslim and non-Christian legislators were appointed by the 
governor-general, in effect alienating Muslims and non-Christians from participating 
in the election process, thus giving them even more incentive to resist or challenge the 
new political regime. 
                                                 
11 United States Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippine Islands: Acts of Congress and Treaties Pertaining 
to the Philippine Islands in Force and Effect July 1, 1919 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1920), 155.  
12 Ibid., 44. 
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 Filipino control of the affairs of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and the 
state more generally, would soon be challenged by the return of the Republicans as the 
majority party in the United States Congress and the election of President Warren 
Harding in 1921.  Harding sent former Governor-General Cameron Forbes and 
General Leonard Wood, former governor of the Moro Province, both American 
Republicans, on a mission to the colony to investigate the conditions of the islands 
after years of administration by American Democrat Governor-General Harrison.  
Regarding the Muslims, the mission reported that: 
The Moros are a unit against independence and are united for continuance of 
American control and in case of separation of the Philippines from the United 
States, desire their portion of the islands to be retained as American territory 
under American control.13 
 
Given American interests in the resource rich southern islands of the archipelago, one 
should be skeptical before accepting the report’s validity. 
The letters from Muslims to former Army officials, however, corroborated the 
words of the report, often referencing a wish for the return of the conditions that 
American military rule of the province had created before Filipino takeover after the 
Jones Law.  One Muslim datu wrote the following to former provincial governor 
General Leonard Wood: 
I, Arolas Tulawie, write you after this long while in remembrance of the days 
when you were stationed in Zamboanga and had frequent occasion to visit our 
troubled island in your official capacity as Department Commander and also as 
Governor.  It is myself [sic] and many others of my people who wish those 
days or rather those conditions with us again.  Not that we have not made any 
progress, but we believe that we should have made much more if we had been 
left under the wise guidance of Americans instead of Filipinos who do not have 
any idea of managing their own people.  Since you have left Zamboanga, we 
                                                 
13 United States, Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands to the 
Secretary of War (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1921), 21. 
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were under an American governor but this governor was governing the Moros 
merely for the pleasure of the politicos in Manila.14 
 
His explicit criticism of Filipinos and their ignorance regarding management suggests 
that any progress that had been made in the province was entirely due to the efforts 
and due diligence of the Muslims themselves.  The American governor ruling only for 
the pleasure of the Filipinos who he is referring to is none other than Democrat-
appointed Frank Carpenter, a firm advocate of Filipinization. 
 An interview with Datu Piang of Dulawan in 1926 further conveys the distrust 
that many Muslims felt towards the Filipinos.15  Datu Piang described the American 
Army officers who governed the Moro Province as “good men and just,” stating that 
“they gave us assurances that they would protect us and not turn us over to those 
whom we do not trust.”  Any doubt that he is referring to Christian Filipinos is erased 
when he declared that “we trusted them [the Americans]….  But year after year, 
slowly, they have given the Christian Filipinos more power over us.”  Datu Piang 
criticized the Filipinos by stating that “their laws are too complicated for us; the 
Moros need a simple government.  Our own is more simple [sic], our laws are laws 
that have been handed down from father to son for many centuries.”  He then stated 
that “my sons have told me [about] one of the bills presented to Congress by Mr. 
Bacon of New York.  They tell me that this is to separate Mindanao [and] Sulu from 
the rest of the Philippines.  That would be better.  Perhaps not the best solution but 
better than present conditions [sic].  Our hearts are heavy just now.”  Comments like 
                                                 
14 Arolas Tulawie to Pershing, May 20, 1923, in BIA Records, File No. 5075-139A, as quoted in 
Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 327-28. 
15 “Interview with Datu Piang of Dulawan, 1926,” Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers, University of 
Michigan, Box 28-24, as cited in Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the 
Philippines, 145. 
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his are examples of the resistance among the Muslim elite to the power shift between 
American and Filipino officials.  His testimony suggests that legislation in the United 
States that would separate Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines found 
support in some Muslim communities. 
Dealing with Muslim Resistance and American Reservations 
Current literature elides the response of the Filipinos to American reservations 
that were sympathetic to the division of the colony due to concerns for the Muslim 
populace.16  Understanding how elite politicians from the colonial majority responded 
to the challenges to their power that came from minority groups gives us a clearer 
picture of the relationships between Christian Filipinos and Muslims and the tensions 
involved in Philippine state formation during the early American colonial period.  The 
ways in which elite Filipinos responded, defended, denied, and sidestepped Muslim 
resistance and American reservations concerning the Muslim groups evidence a 
subversion of American political ideology and a challenge to American claims that 
their primary purpose in the archipelago was a benevolent one:  to train the Filipinos 
in democratic governance until they were ready to govern themselves.  Written 
discourse regarding the Muslim tribes would become a site for Filipinos to frequently 
launch accusations against the United States government and its colonial intentions 
and ultimately challenge and redefine its colonial mission. 
Denial and Fictive Amity 
                                                 
16 See Vicente L. Rafael, White Love, and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2000) 6, for one example.  Rafael states that American colonial officials “chose to 
maintain this Spanish geography [referring to the islands of the archipelago] after some short-lived 
discussions of partitioning the colony.”  The shape of the Philippine colony, however, was still debated 
even in the 1920s, and Filipino nationalists responded accordingly. 
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One of the most frequent responses among Philippine statesmen was to deny 
the charges that their Muslim “brethren” did not support a united Philippine polity.  
Manuel Quezon, as Philippine resident commissioner to the United States in 1914, 
often responded first to amendments calling for the separation of Mindanao by 
Republicans who were sympathetic to Muslim dissenters.  Iowan Republican 
Representative Horace Mann Towner’s suggested one such bill in 1914.17  Since 
Towner made such a proposal in part due to Muslim protests against Christian Filipino 
influence in their affairs, Quezon addressed these in his counterargument to Congress, 
explaining that:    
It was, in truth, very difficult for an ordinary intelligence like my own to 
explain how uneducated people—some of them completely uncivilized—
would be able to place their oratory qualities at the height of those of persons 
of superior education that have dedicated themselves especially to studying 
and practicing eloquence.18 
 
His testimony throws doubt on the veracity of such petitions, capitalizing on the 
American and Filipino perception that Muslims were uneducated and uncivilized.  
Quezon underscored this fact because the petitions sent to Congress were all in 
English—since English fluency was limited among the Muslims, these petitions were 
often written in the native languages and then translated.  Quezon framed the 
eloquence of these translations as proof that they could not have actually originated 
from Muslim writers.   
                                                 
17 The bill referred to here is the Jones Bill, which will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter. 
18Manuel Luis Quezon, Discursos Del Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, Comisionado Residente de Filipinas, 
pronunciados en la cámara de representantes de los Estados Unidos con motivo de la discusión del bill 
Jones…. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), ed. by William Atkinson Jones.  Original reads: Era, en 
verdad, bastante difícil para una inteligencia ordinaria como la mía explicar cómo una gente 
ineducada—algunos de ellos de hecho completamente incivilizados—podía poner sus cualidades 
oratorias a la altura de las de personas de educación superior que se han dedicado especialmente a 
estudiar y practicar la elocuencia. 
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 In fact, he stated that “I have asked myself many times if the hand that                   
recorded those addresses wasn’t, in all those cases, a gloved hand, and if the 
translator—because they are translated in English so that that the person to whom they 
are directed can understand them—wasn’t really pronouncing an address he himself 
made.”19 
 He thus dismissed the content of the petitions by arguing that all they reflected 
were the opinions of the “glove”—the translators fluent in English.  Christian Filipino 
Conrado Benitez, one of the deans of the University of the Philippines, wrote a 
response to the release of W. Cameron Forbes’s The Philippine Islands in 1931, which 
provides us with further elaboration of what Quezon meant.20  He writes that some of 
the documents signed by Muslims that requested permanent annexation to the United 
States were highly questionable, and cites a critique made by Forbes of the document, 
stating that “it was obvious from a study of it that it was prepared by American and 
foreign residents in the Islands….  Many of the Moros signing it did so with their 
thumb marks, as they were unable to write and presumably unable to read, so that it is 
a matter of opinion as to whether or not they were correctly informed as to the 
contents of the paper.”21  It seems like it would also be a matter of opinion that the 
Muslims did, in fact, stamp it since thumb marks are more easily forged than 
                                                 
19 Quezon, Discursos, 132.  Original reads:  Me he preguntado muchas veces si la mano que redactó 
estos discursos era, en todos los casos, una mano enguantada, y si el traductor—porque se tradujeron 
al inglés para que los comprendiera la persona a quien iban dirigidas—estaba realmente pronunciando 
un discurso hecho por él mismo. (132)   
20 Conrado Benitez, “A Filipino’s Point of View (Forbes’ The Philippine Islands),” Journal of Political 
Economy 39, no. 1 (Feb 1931): 86-100. 
21 W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), vol. II, 47, 
quoted in Benitez, “A Filipino’s Point of View,” 93. 
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signatures, especially without any reliable verification of the thumb marks of each 
Muslim signatory. 
Manuel Quezon was not the only Filipino statesman to deny American claims 
that Muslims wished for a separate colony.  Following the publication of the Wood-
Forbes Report in 1921, Camilo Osias, as resident commissioner in the Philippines, 
wrote in 1924 that: 
In their now famous, not to say infamous report, Wood and Forbes intimated 
that Mindanao and Sulu, that large and fertile territory inhabited by our 
brethren in the south, ‘in case of separation of the Philippines from the United 
States,’ should be ‘retained as American territory under American control.’  
We oppose the false conclusion that may be drawn from this assertion that our 
Filipino brethren prefer American control to Filipino control or the control of 
themselves and their own countrymen.  We are irrevocably opposed to any 
attempt at dismemberment of Philippine territory.  We want the integrity of our 
country preserved at all costs.  We do not want an independent Luzon and 
Visayan republic and an American controlled Southern Philippines.   
We want a republic of the entire Philippines.  We received this country as a 
legacy from our forefathers.  It must be our high resolve to keep and preserve it 
as one, compact, and united, under the inspiration of a historic past and a 
common destiny and transmit it from generation to generation in all its 
integrity.22 [Emphasis his] 
 
Osias’s response clearly articulates the tension involved during this period regarding 
the possible separation of the Muslim south.  His passion communicates itself clearly 
not only through his diction, but also the stylistic choice of emphasizing what he terms 
the desire of Filipinos.  He deliberately chose not to refer to the inhabitants of 
Mindanao and Sulu by religion but instead labeled them “our brethren in the south.”  
Such a move reveals his conception of the Philippine colony as akin to a family 
household in which all inhabitants are members related by blood, not just politics.  He 
refers to imagined common forefathers that have gifted the country to Osias’s 
                                                 
22 Quezon, Manuel Luis and Camilo Osias.  Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause (Manila: 
Manila Book Company, 1924), 191.  
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generation.  His references to a “historic past” and a common “destiny” are fruits of 
fiction as well—the history of the Muslim south differed in significant ways from the 
regions dominated by the Catholic Church and the eventual formation of the country 
was hardly destined.  By “brethrenizing” the Muslims, he likens the desire to remain 
apart from the Philippine polity to the desire of querulous cousins wanting to separate 
from their family. 
 In denying claims that there were Muslim groups against independence, 
Filipino statesmen implicitly conveyed that relations with the Muslims were good.  
They also did so explicitly by referencing “authentic documents” proving this amity 
that never seem to have been proffered.  In fact, promoting the idea that relations were 
good was another important response among the Philippine political elite. 
 Consider a statement by Manuel Quezon’s successor to the position of 
Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, Pedro Guevara.  In May of 1927, in a 
publication entitled Are Filipinos Ready for Independence?, Guevara states that: 
During the administration of Governor General Harrison, a most friendly and 
brotherly relationship existed between Mohammedans and Christians in the 
Islands, and nothing has occurred since that time to cause any change in this 
feeling.  In proof of my assertion to this effect, I am prepared to produce at any 
time authentic documents signed by prominent Mohammedans in the Islands 
which I have in my possession.23   
 
These “authentic documents” are never actually proffered nor cited.  Guevara’s 
statement here runs contrary to the sentiments expressed in 1926 by Datu Piang that 
the separation of Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines would be better 
                                                 
23 Pedro Guevara, “The Philippine Problem,” in Are the Filipinos ready for Independence? 
(Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1927), ed. Clyde L King et al., 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 11.   
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than having these regions controlled by Filipinos.24  While the opinion of the majority 
of Muslims during this time period remains elusive, it is clear that there was 
opposition to Filipino takeover from the Muslim elite threatened by the shift in power 
from American hands to those of the Filipinos. 
Racial Similarity, Civilizational Inferiority 
Pedro Guevara provides us with further insight regarding the Philippine elite’s 
response to reservations among Americans concerning Filipino control of Mindanao.  
He states that “much has been said of the antagonism which it is assumed exists 
between the Filipinos of Mohammedan and Christian beliefs.  It has even been stated 
that those adhering to these differing religious faiths do not belong to the same race, 
although this is in direct contradiction to the statements of noted historians both past 
and present.”25  Once again, references to specific historians are absent, but his 
response is valuable in that he defends the idea that the territorial integrity of the 
country should be maintained because despite religious differences, Muslims and 
Christians remain the same race. 
Ethnographic maps of the archipelago drawn towards the end of Spanish rule 
by Jesuit missionaries, however, do show racial differences among the various peoples 
of the archipelago, classifying the majority of the population as Malay, Indonesian, or 
Aeta.26  Such distinctions, however, seem largely lost on high profile Americans that 
visited the archipelago.  Their comments proved to be valuable references for 
Christian Filipino Jose P. Melencio, director of the United States Philippine Press 
                                                 
24  “Interview with Datu Piang of Dulawan, 1926,” Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers, University of 
Michigan, Box 28-24, as cited in Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 145. 
25 Pedro Guevara, “The Philippine Problem,” in Are the Filipinos ready for Independence?, 11.  
26 Please see appendix for a map and these distinctions. 
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Bureau, who, similar to Pedro Guevara, also commented on the racial homogeneity of 
the peoples found on the more than 7,000 islands of the archipelago.  In his Arguments 
against Philippine Independence and Their Answers, he wrote that one of the principal 
sources of opposition stemmed from idea that “the Filipinos are a heterogeneous 
conglomeration of tribal groups, hopelessly differing from one another not only in 
language but also in customs and aspirations; and that, if given independence, they 
will be ‘cutting each other’s throats.’”27 
His counterargument tries to establish that the Filipinos are not a 
conglomeration of tribal groups but rather a “homogenous people” by drawing on the 
observations of prominent Americans, such as former Governor General Taft.  He 
quotes Taft as saying that: 
the word ‘tribe’ gives an erroneous impression.  There is no tribal relation 
among them.  There is a radical solidarity among the Filipino people, 
undoubtedly.  They are homogenous.  I cannot tell the difference between an 
Ilocano and a Tagalog, or a Visayan.  The Ilocanos, it would seem to me, have 
something of an admixture of the Japanese blood; the Tagalogs have rather 
more of the Chinese; and it seems to me that the Visayans had still more.  But 
to me all the Filipinos were alike.28 
 
The inclusion of Taft’s unsophisticated commentary indicates that the audience of 
Melencio’s publication is most likely American.  Melencio’s use of Taft’s unnuanced, 
racially tinged, objectifying observation to further a political agenda directed at 
protecting the Philippines’ territorial integrity is clever as the majority of his audience 
had most likely never visited the islands.  Also, for an American to contradict 
Melencio, in essence, would amount to contradicting Taft himself. 
                                                 
27 Jose P. Melencio, Arguments against Philippine Independence and their Answers (DC: Philippine 
Press Bureau, 1919), 15. 
28 Ibid. 
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 While Filipinos argued on the one hand that they were racially tied to the 
Muslim tribes in the South (as well as other indigenous groups in what became known 
as the Mountain Province of Luzon), so too did they highlight the civilizational 
inferiority among the different tribes.  Melencio, for instance, states explicitly that:  
it is not true that the Filipino people are savages.  Neither is it true that they are 
semi-savages.  It is admitted that there are about 500,000 non-Christian 
peoples in the archipelago, who used to be in a stage of savagery, dressed in 
scanty garments, indulging in head-hunting at times, and dwelling in the 
mountains with only the bow and arrow as their venerable companions.   But 
the days of head-hunting are gone.  The mountain tribes as well as the Moros 
of Mindanao are fast being won over to the ways of civilization and of 
Americanism.  Schools, hospitals and religious centers have been instituted 
among them.  Many of them have been Christianized.  They actually enter into 
trade transactions with the rest of the natives. [Emphasis added] 
 
According to Melencio, civilization and Americanism go hand in hand.  The measures 
of progress among the minority tribes are not only schools, hospitals, and religious 
centers, but also conversion to Christianity.29  Their participation with the rest of the 
natives is also highlighted—perhaps Melencio believed in a cultural osmosis whereby 
through contact alone the civilization of the Christianized natives would permeate the 
savage membrane of the minority groups.  What is clear from his testimony is that he 
felt that this evidence merited inclusion in a book promoting Philippine independence 
and would thus prove compelling to the American audience for which it was intended. 
Blame Uncle Sam 
Elite Filipinos not only articulated that Christian Filipinos were higher on the 
scale of civilization than their Muslim counterparts, but also defined the Muslim tribes 
                                                 
29Jose P. Melencio, Arguments against Philippine Independence and their Answers (DC: Philippine 
Press Bureau, 1919), 10. 
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of the South and highlighted their “base” instincts that lurked beneath the surface.30  
Americans were blamed for awakening these instincts that purportedly existed among 
Muslims as well as inciting resistance to incorporation into the larger Philippine 
polity.  Vicente G. Bunuan, the Director of the Philippine Press Bureau located in the 
Washington office of the Philippine Commission of Independence, stated that “it is 
true that among the Moros, as a result of organized effort of American residents in the 
Islands who advocate permanent annexation, there are isolated utterances against 
independence.”31 
He goes on further to elaborate how American actions have created this 
reaction among the Muslim populace.  He states that: 
our opponents have been constantly ringing into the ears of the Moros their 
being fearless, valiant, and brave; their never having been conquered by the 
Filipinos of the North; their being their traditional enemies; and their being 
promised protection by the United States against the Filipinos.  You can well 
imagine the psychological effect of this upon the mind of the picturesque, 
therefore highly imaginative, Moro.  His dormant instincts to resist, to hate, to 
kill are aroused and so today, with the exception of the large group of Moros 
that have stood through thick and thin with the Filipinos in their stand on the 
independence question, animosity instead of amity, friction instead of 
friendship, alienation instead of attraction, govern the relations between 
Mohammedans and Filipinos.32 
 
Bunuan’s rationale for the motives behind the desire of Americans to incite such 
resistance is largely economic.  He highlights the fact that the process began when 
“Mindanao became a tempting rubber prize.”33  By pointing to the natural resources of 
the island and labeling them a prize to be won, Bunuan criticizes American colonial 
                                                 
30 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 
31 Vicente G. Bunuan, Arguments for Immediate Philippine Independence (Supported by facts and 
figures) (Washington D.C.: Philippine Press Bureau, 1924), 13. 
32 Vicente G. Bunuan, “Democracy in the Philippines,” in Are the Filipinos ready for Independence, 27.  
33
 Ibid., 28. 
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intentions as a cover up for an imperial hunger for resources.  For this argument to 
have any moral force, he takes for granted that his audience will recognize his implicit 
stance that the rubber of Mindanao belongs rightfully to the Christian Filipino people 
and not just to Mindanao’s historic occupants.  As we have seen, however, a large 
contingent of Mindanao did not consider itself an integral part of the Filipino polity 
(as many still do not in the present time) and resisted the inclusion of its resources as 
national property.   
Subverting American Political Ideology 
In addition to placing blame on the United States Administration for the 
resistance in the Muslim areas, elite Filipinos at the same time used American 
principles of democracy to dismiss or belittle Muslim complaints.  Vicente G. Bunuan, 
for example, argued that the opinions of Muslims in favor of continued American 
presence in the archipelago was insignificant compared to the views held by the 
majority of Filipinos.  He wrote that “even granting for the sake of argument that the 
Moros are for continuance of American control it must not be forgotten that the Moro 
population constitute only four per cent of the Filipino people.  Certainly in this great 
Republic [the United States] where the desire of the majority is the ruling factor in the 
determination of any question, the wish of the 96 percent of the total 11,500,000 
Filipinos should not be subordinated to the wish of a few.”34  He subverts colonial 
ideology by highlighting majority rule and ignores American principles of self-
determination that might similarly be used to argue that the Muslim populations 
                                                 
34 Vicente G. Bunuan, Arguments for Immediate Philippine Independence (Supported by Facts and 
Figures) (Washington, DC: Philippine Press Bureau, 1924), 13. 
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deserved their own representative government distinct from that of the Christian 
Filipino tribes. 
 Jose Melencio similarly draws on American political principles regarding 
representation as proof of fair treatment of Muslims.  He states that “the non-Christian 
peoples of the Philippines have always been accorded just treatment by the Christian 
population.  Now they have representatives in each of the Houses of the Philippine 
Legislature.  There is a Moro Senator, two Moro representatives, and one Igorot.  The 
Mohammedan religion is respected by the rest of the archipelago, resulting in a closer 
relation between the Moros of Mindanao and the Christians of Luzon and the 
Visayas.”35  Quezon fails to mention, however, that many of these positions were 
appointed  by the Governor-General rather than elected by the Muslims and non-
Christians that they were given authority to represent. 
Just as Quezon references American ideology to defend Filipino treatment of 
Muslims and non-Christians, so too does Jose Melencio draw on American history to 
justify their dismissal as well.  He states that  
…it is prophesied that if independence is granted, ‘the people will quarrel, 
there will be rival factions, and neither will have the mental balance to accept 
results that are adverse.’  So be it.  But we answer: Was not America’s civil 
war the great disruption that promptly solidified her national structure, until 
today she is the mightiest commonwealth on the face of the globe?36 
 
By highlighting tumultuous events in the American past, he defends the right of the 
Philippines to go through its own trials in order to reach a more storied future.  In such 
a narrative, he argues that although the southern Muslim tribes and Christians may be 
                                                 
35 José P. Melencio, Arguments against Philippine Independence and their Answers (Washington, DC: 
Philippine Press Bureau, 1919), 11.   
36 Jose P. Melencio, Arguments against Philippine Independence and their Answers (DC: Philippine 
Press Bureau, 1919, 17. 
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rival factions, they are ultimately part of an eventual solidified national structure.  He 
also equates the uncompromising southern American politicians to the Muslim 
minority of the archipelago to dismiss the idea that the country’s independence should 
be refused. 
Excerpts from the works of Bunuan, Quezon, and Melencio evidence that 
Filipino politicians were becoming increasingly fluent in the idiom of American 
democracy and political ideology.  They mobilized experiences from American 
history, such as the Civil War, and Democratic principles like majority rule and 
political representation to support Filipino independence and to dismiss the complaints 
and grievances of the Muslim peoples in the southern islands of the archipelago.  
Subverting historical experiences of their colonial metropole and its ideology in such a 
way mocked the official discourse of the American colonial administration and their 
supposedly noble, limited intentions of preparing Filipinos for the independence of the 
islands.   
The elite were also quick to frame American intentions regarding the education 
of the Filipinos in democracy as driven by capitalist motives and profit.  Bunuan 
explicitly declares that: 
Opponents of independence refer to the Moros as elements which the Filipinos 
would be unable to handle once the Philippines are independent.  This 
argument has gained momentum since Mindanao became known as the richest 
spot on earth for the growing of rubber, simultaneous with which discovery a 
movement was started looking toward the segregation of that region from the 
rest of the Archipelago.37 
 
                                                 
37Vicente G. Bunuan, “Democracy in the Philippines,” in Are the Filipinos ready for Independence, 27. 
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Bunuan uses Muslim opposition to Philippine independence in order to highlight the 
economic potential of Mindanao towards supplying America’s increasing demand for 
rubber.   
American descriptions of the region highlight its economic importance.  One 
publication from the Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce, titled The Moro Province: 
Philippine Islands; and a Few of its Resources, describes Mindanao as “the second 
largest island in the Philippines, and probably the richest in natural advantages. It is 
called ‘a white man’s country,’ meaning that the climate is especially salubrious for 
people who have been accustomed to reside in temperate zones.”38  It goes on to 
describe the rubber industry, which began with American colonization in 1905, as “no 
longer an experiment, but a thoroughly proven success.”39  It continues by declaring 
that the Moro Province’s soil is “not surpassed by any rubber growing district in the 
world.”40 
P.J. Wester’s Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago: Their  atural Resources 
and Opportunities for Development, published by the Philippine Bureau of 
Agriculture, writes that gold has been found in all the rivers of the province of 
Agusan, describes the “enormous latent wealth” in Bukidnon, and discusses the vast 
commercial forests and potential for oil in Cotabato—all provinces in Mindanao with 
                                                 
38 Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce, Moro Province: Philippine Islands, and a Few of its Resources 
(Zamboanga: Chamber of Commerce, 1912), 5. 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid. 
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majority Muslim and non-Christian populations.41  He goes on to describe each 
province in detail and its potential for commercial development. 
Despite these descriptions, however, Bunuan is ultimately incorrect in dating 
the movement to segregate the island region from the rest of the archipelago to the 
discovery of its economic potential.  After all, suggestions that Mindanao be 
administered separately from the rest of the colony predated the American regime.  
While economic motives were probably powerful incentives for the American 
politicians that wanted to retain the archipelago, Bunuan’s charge also reveals his own 
sense of Christian Filipino entitlement to these same resources rather than an advocacy 
for the concerns of native Muslim inhabitants.  Bunuan’s statement seems to reveal 
not only the ulterior motives of Americans, but possibly Filipinos as well regarding 
the region’s resources. 
 He was not the only Christian Filipino to point to American ulterior motives in 
the archipelago.   Attorney Marcial P. Lichuaco contributed an article titled “The 
Conquest of the Philippines by the United States,” to the American Academy of Social 
and Political Science publication Are the Filipinos Ready for Independence in 1927, 
writing frankly regarding the fact the United States had ulterior motives in their Asian 
colony.  His work is addressed to Americans and the American colonial regime.  He 
states, “I suggest that you admit to the Filipinos the interests which you have in 
maintaining some form of control or authority in those Islands.  We Filipinos are also 
a practical people and, recognizing your interest and the relations which have bound 
                                                 
41 See Wester, Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago: Their  atural Resources and Opportunities for 
Development (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1928), 25, 33, 49.  Also look at the extensive collection of 
photographs featuring the “vast” commercial forests, pristine rivers, and open fields.   
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us together for so many years, we will, I feel sure, make some concessions compatible 
to your needs and to our present demands.”42  Lichuaco’s words convey the struggle of 
elite Filipinos to find ways to achieve their independence.  The frustration they 
experienced in attempting to determine what it would take to achieve their goals is 
evident in the way Lichuaco concludes, venting that that “the demands of the Filipinos 
have already been made known to you in every conceivable form and manner as 
complete, absolute, and immediate independence.  Those are our aspirations, those are 
our aims, and those are our interests as we see them.  It is for you to tell us yours, and 
to lay your cards down on the table—face up—as we have already done.”43  
Lichuaco’s principled statement proves that many of the Filipino elite saw benefit in 
being free from American interference and independent, and denied the official stance 
of the U.S. as articulated by the Jones Law, which stated that the United States would 
withdraw sovereignty when a stable government in the islands was established.44  He 
thus challenged the American administration to reveal what they were truly after.  
Certain members of the elite accepted American imperial motives and saw 
benefit in the resources of Mindanao, even so far as using them as bargaining chips for 
independence.  Consider the testimony by Felipe Mabilangan, a student at the School 
of Citizenship and Public Affairs at the University of Syracuse and future Filipino 
diplomat, to the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs in 1930.  The 
                                                 
42 Marcial P. Lichuaco, “The Demands of the Filipinos—Is the United States Meeting Them?,” in Are 
the Filipinos Ready for Independence (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 1927), 33.  
43 Ibid. 
44 United States Bureau of Insular Affairs, Philippine Islands: Acts of Congress and Treaties Pertaining 
to the Philippine Islands in Force and Effect July 1, 1919 (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1920), 33.  
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chairman asks Felipe if he favors the granting of any special privileges to the United 
States given its service in the Philippine archipelago.  Mabilangan answers “well, for 
the United States Government the privilege of the exploitation of natural resources, 
our natural resources in Mindanao.” 
 The chairman responds, perplexed, “just what do you mean by granting the 
United States Government special privileges in Mindanao?” 
Mr. Mabilangan replies “something like agreements between the two countries, 
the independent government and the United States, in the exploitation of economic 
natural resources for the benefit of both peoples.” 
 The chairman protests, stating “but our government never has followed the 
practice of going into the exploitation of any lands in foreign countries.  Do you mean 
the granting of concessions to American corporations?” 
 Mabilangan responds by saying “yes, possibly; if it would be for the benefit of 
both peoples; that is, to develop these backward regions in Mindanao for the benefit of 
both peoples.”45 
 The development of the “backward regions” suggests that they were not only 
talking about Mindanao’s valuable resources, but also ways in which to get the local 
(largely Muslim) populations to cooperate.  What is in the best interests of the 
Muslims, however, is noticeably absent in Mabilangan’s suggestion.  As for the 
chairman and what he says regarding the United States’ selfless practices and refusal 
to exploit foreign lands, one would like to hear how he would defend the Bell Trade 
                                                 
45 Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Independence for the Philippine Islands, 
Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 71st Cong., 2d sess., 1930, 315.  
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Act of 1946, signed into law on July 4 (the same day of Philippine Independence), 
which established clearly exploitative measures that would greatly handicap the 
archipelago’s economic growth.46  These included eight years of free trade between 
the countries (limiting the Philippines’ ability to establish homegrown industries that 
could compete with far more numerous, cheap American products), the imposition of 
absolute quotas on Philippine imports to the U.S. (although none on U.S. exports to 
the Philippines), the necessity to get the United States’ president’s approval to alter the 
exchange rate of the Philippine peso or to levy export taxes, and the so-called “parity” 
clause, which granted American citizens and corporations the same rights as Filipinos 
to use and own natural resources and operate public utilities.  During the American 
colonial period, ownership of natural resources was limited by the Philippine 
Constitution of 1935 to companies that were at least sixty percent Filipino-owned.  
The chairman’s words ring hollow as American interests in the resources of the 
archipelago were preserved (even enhanced) despite Philippine independence in 
1946.47 
Conclusion 
By focusing on the various ways that the Philippine elite responded to Muslim 
resistance and American reservations with Filipino rule, I argue that Filipinos not only 
mimicked colonial methods as seen in Chapter 3—but also mocked them.  They 
                                                 
46 See M. Cuaderno, “The Bell Trade Act and the Philippine Economy,” Pacific Affairs 25 (December 
1952): 323-333 for one Filipino critique of the act published recently after the Act’s passage in 1946.   
For fuller coverage, see Steven R. Shalom, “Philippine Acceptance of the Bell Trade Act of 1946: A 
Study of Manipulatory Democracy,” Pacific Historical Review 49 (August 1980): 499-517.   
47 See Shalom, “Philippine Acceptance.” 
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subverted American ideology to defend their rights to independence and used 
Mindanao and the Muslim populace to question the United States’ true motives. 
This can be seen in the speeches and published works of Manuel Quezon, 
Philippine resident commissioner to the United States, who defended Filipino 
management of Muslim affairs by casting doubt on supposed Muslim opposition 
expressed through documents written in English, and oftentimes signed by Muslim 
thumbprint.  Quezon suggested that these documents were a more accurate reflection 
of the wishes of the American translators.  In 1921, following the publication of the 
Wood-Forbes report, which stated again that Muslims preferred continuation of 
American rule, Camilo Osias similarly argued that this was a false conclusion arrived 
at by Americans with a vested interest in increasing American colonial control. 
Vicente Bunuan even pointed to the United States as the responsible party for 
inciting resistance among the Muslims, motivated by an imperial hunger for resources.   
He argues that Americans wanted to separate the region from the rest of the 
Philippines when “Mindanao became a tempting rubber prize.”48 
The Christian Philippine elite also referenced the notion that they had a 
common racial stock in common with Muslims, capitalizing on western views of race 
and Americans statements like those of Governor-General Taft that Filipinos were 
homogenous and all looked alike.  Manuel Quezon even pointed out that America’s 
racially distinct Native Americans were essentially under the control of the United 
States Congress.  He then argued that there could be no solid ground for Americans to 
deprive the Philippine legislature of power over their own Muslim minority when 
                                                 
48 Vicente G. Bunuan, “Democracy in the Philippines,” in Are the Filipinos ready for Independence, 28. 
 108 
Christian Filipinos and Muslims were considerably more racially similar than 
Americans with European heritage and their Native American minorities.49 
Publications and speeches by members of the Christian Filipino elite, 
evidenced by Bunuan, Quezon, and Melencio, demonstrate their increasing fluency in 
the idiom of American colonial ideology and history, allowing them to subvert the 
historical experiences of the metropole in order to mock the “democratic training" of 
American colonial officials as well as their intentions in the islands.  Bunuan 
referenced majority rule to dismiss the wishes of the insignificant Muslim minority.  
Quezon argued that Filipino fairness and democratic capability could be seen through 
the inclusion of a Moro Senator and representatives in the government, despite the fact 
that they were appointed and not elected like Christian representatives and senators.  
Melencio dismissed the concerns of American critics regarding the archipelago’s 
future as a single state given rival factions by citing the American experience of the 
Civil War as proof of national structure could be solidified by such divisions.   
The testimony of Syracuse University educated, future prominent Philippine 
foreign service diplomat Felipe Mabilangan during the hearings of the United States 
Senate Committee of Territories and Insular Affairs provides particular insight.  He 
explicitly references the resources of Mindanao as a bargaining chip for independence.  
By suggesting that the region could be used as a reward for America’s service in the 
archipelago as long as the development of the region would be for the benefit of both 
peoples, he shows us the importance of the area to the nation-state and the political 
cache that the region held for the elite.  Far from being peripheral to nation-state 
                                                 
49Quezon, Discursos, 130-131. 
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development, the Muslim regions and peoples of the archipelago were central to the 
Christian Filipino elite’s quest for Philippine autonomy and independence.  Indeed, 
they would even become a site of resistance and challenge to the American state and 





This study has explored the historical development of the relationships 
between elite Filipino Christians and their Muslim counterparts by essentially 
evaluating elite, Christian Filipino responses in the early 1900s to the perceived threat 
of losing the predominantly Muslim regions of the archipelago, regions which they 
already viewed as belonging to a Filipino nation.  I argue that Filipinos responded to 
this possible division by highlighting racial similarities between themselves and their 
Muslim counterparts while at the same time asserting civilizational superiority.  After 
all, Christian Filipinos did not just want to keep the imagined borders of the nation in 
tact—they wanted to do so in a way in which they were in control of a greater amount 
of territory.   Their responses prove that Muslims played a critical role in helping 
Filipino political leaders define a national Filipino character and fortify their power 
even at the very inception of American colonial rule in the archipelago. 
I then contend that with the Filipinization of the archipelago’s governance, the 
encouragement of the American Democratic administration, the passage of the Jones 
Bill in 1916, and the outbreak of World War I, Filipino politicians became the 
dominant players in Philippine Affairs.  Despite being “colonized” themselves, they 
were put in power over minority groups in the archipelago considered less civilized 
then themselves and whose resources they coveted.  The ways they formulated policy 
and the claims they made to progress were colonial in character and American in 
appearance. 
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Philippine Commission member Vicente Ilustre’s Bill in 1914 extended the 
general laws of the rest of the archipelago over the Muslim regions, creating a secular 
justice system that more closely resembled that of the United States.  In addition to 
changes in governance, Filipinos tried to prove their capacity for autonomy by 
showing that similar to what Americans claimed to have done before them, they too 
could claim to educate other peoples, investigating and discovering their talents in 
order to develop them.  They took charge of improving public health in the Muslim 
and non-Christian provinces by building the institutions of “modern” medicine, 
including hospitals and dispensaries; acceptance of Western medicine delivered via 
Filipino hands was vouched for by the fact that women of the “best” families went to 
receive treatment.  Filipinos invested in constructing public works characteristic of 
“civilized” countries, such as the establishment of telephone lines and potable water.  
They also posited that they could develop and increase the agricultural output of 
Mindanao and, in a clear display of colonialism, encouraged the migration of Christian 
Filipinos to Muslim areas of Mindanao, which they defended as a mechanism for 
bringing Christians and Muslims together and abolishing the differences between 
them.   
Vicente Rafael writes that: 
The allegory of benevolent assimilation thus foresaw the possibility, if not the 
inevitability, of colonialism’s end.  But equally important, it also insisted on 
defining and delimiting the means to that end.  While colonial rule may be a 
transitional stage of self-rule, the self that rules itself can only emerge by way 
of an intimate relationship with a colonial master who sets the standards and 
practices of discipline to mold the conduct of the colonial subject.  In other 
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words, the culmination of colonial rule, self-government, can be achieved only 
when the subject has learned to colonize itself.1 
 
Democratic control of the United States Congress and Presidency afforded 
Filipino politicians unprecedented opportunities in formulating policy and developing 
the regions of the Muslim South in a colonial fashion.  The progress that they made 
was touted as proof of their capacity to be autonomous.  In the words of prominent 
Filipinos like Camilo Osias, former director of education, “it remained for the period 
when the Filipino people and Filipino officials had better control of their own affairs 
and of the non-Christian people to achieve the greatest work of uplift and of progress 
ever accomplished in the non-Christian territory and for the non-Christian people of 
the Philippines.”2  Osias continued, stating that “one of the great achievements of the 
Filipinos in the last few years is found in the great work of uplift and nationalization 
of our Non-Christian brethren.”3  Although colonized, the Filipino elite occupied 
positions of authority over the Muslim regions.  They were, in effect, trying to prove 
that they were capable of governing themselves and establishing a stable government 
by modeling the methods of rule used by their colonial masters.   
However, as noted by theorists such as Homi Bhabha and others, such mimicry 
was also menacing to the American colonial regime.  Anderson Warwick writes that: 
a critical awareness of mimicry, of the uncanny sense of the copy, could also 
challenge the boundaries of citizenship in the colony.  Supposedly mimetic 
performance might serve, at this deeper level, to reveal the artificiality, the 
play, of conventional distinctions between native and other, to illuminate and 
make strange the “cultured self” of colonized and colonialist—in the case of 
                                                 
1 Vicente Rafael, White Love, and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2000), 22. 
2 Camilo Osias, Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause (Manila: Manila Book Company, 
1924), 43. 
3 Osias, Governor-General Wood, 82-83. 
 113 
the latter, to disturb a narcissistic overvaluation of his own mental processes, to 
eat away at his sense of authenticity and control.4 
 
Indeed, Americans seemed to have hardly accepted Christian Filipino imitation, and 
instead viewed their attempts as unfaithful.  Major Frank S. Bourns, an army surgeon 
and chief who would become the chief of the Bureau of Health, also dismissed the 
calculated nature by which Filipinos sought to model the United States in order to 
show their own capabilities, and instead attributed it to a racial characteristic: 
the race is quick to learn and has a fairly good natural ability, but such a class 
will have to be educated before great responsibility can be placed in its 
hands….My idea [is that] if [Filipinos were] associated with…a sufficient 
number of Americans who are honorable and upright in their dealings, there 
would be a very strong tendency on their part to do as their colleagues do.  
They are natural imitators; it is a racial characteristic.5 
  
In fact, the Filipino penchant for mimicry was a commonly cited character trait that 
suggested their semicivilized state.6 
If Filipino colonial mimicry was menacing to the American regime, then 
certainly Filipino mockery must have been more so.  By analyzing discourse related to 
independence made by important political figures of the era, namely Manuel Quezon, 
Camilo Osias, Vicente Bunuan, and Jose Melencio, one sees that the American 
imperial mission provided the elite with a new political idiom—that of American 
government principles such as representation and majority rule that were used to 
sidestep Muslim reservations and resistance that were cited by American officials.  
Filipino officials even referenced the outsider status and racial differences of Native 
                                                 
4 Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the 
Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 206. 
5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1905), vol 1, 505, in Rafael, White Love, 34. 
6 See Rafael, White Love, 34.  
 114 
Americans in the United States to defend the legitimacy of their control over the 
Muslim regions.  In defending Philippine policy and relations toward the Muslims, the 
Filipino elite ultimately subverted American political ideology, demonstrating a grasp 
of principles of American government and using them to challenge and redefine the 
American colonial mission. 
By assessing elite Christian Filipino responses to the possibility that Muslim 
regions of the Philippines could have been separated from the rest of the archipelago 
by the American government in the early 1900s, we gain a window into the nascent 
relationship between the Christian Filipinos and the Muslim-dominated regions of 
Mindanao and Sulu as well as the strategies used by Filipinos to both comply with and 
rebel against the specious American doctrine of “benevolent assimilation” and 
governing the Filipinos until they were ready to govern themselves.  Ultimately, 
looking at this relationship demonstrates that Americans, along with other western 
powers, did not have any particular license to the ideology and imperial language they 
used to defend their colonial actions.  Elite Christian Filipinos learned to speak in the 
same idiom to defend their establishment of a stable government, their control over 
“the wild peoples” (Muslims and other non-Christians), and the placing of the “white 




1) Mapa de las razas de Filipinas, 1899 
(Racial Map of the Philippines)
7
 
                                                 
7 U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Atlas of the Philippine Islands 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900).  Although published by the United States 
government, the maps in this atlas are the fruit of the Jesuit Observatory under the supervision of 
director Rev. José Algue, who agreed to cooperate with the United States Government to publish the 
series.  The Muslim regions are highlighted in darker green while the lighter green denotes the non-
Christian tribes and the “newly converted” Christians.  The yellow regions denote the territory of the 
“Hispanic Christian Filipinos” (in the language of the atlas).  The key follows on the next page. 
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3) The administrative organization of the Moro Province, 1900-19139 
Insular Government 
(Governor General and the Philippine Commission) 
 
Moro Province 
(Governor and Legislative Council) 
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9 For original chart, see Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim 
Filipinos, 1899-1920 (Quezon City:  Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the 
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